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Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule
Printer-friendly version Date:
February 20, 1998
Docket Number:
980212036-8036-01
[Federal Register: February 20, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 34)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 8825-8833]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr20fe98-24]
[[Page 8825]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part IV
Department of Commerce
_______________________________________________________________________
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
15 CFR Chapter XXIII
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses;
Proposed Rule
[[Page 8826]]
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
15 CFR Chapter XXIII
[Docket No. 980212036-8036-01]
RIN 0660-AA11
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and
Addresses
AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), Commerce.
ACTION: Proposed rule; request for public comment.
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SUMMARY: This document sets forth ways to improve technical management
of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS). Specifically, it describes
the process by which the Federal government will transfer management of
the Internet DNS to a private not-for-profit corporation. The document
also proposes to open up to competition the administration of top level
domains and the registration of domain names.
DATES: Comments must be received by March 23, 1998.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Karen Rose, Office of
International Affairs, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), Room 4701, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230 or sent via
electronic mail to dns@ntia.doc.gov. Messages to that address will
receive a reply in acknowledgment. Comments submitted in electronic
form should be in ASCII, WordPerfect (please specify version), or
Microsoft Word (please specify version) format. Comments received will
be posted on the NTIA website at www.ntia.doc.gov. Detailed
information about electronic filing is available on the NTIA website,
www.ntia.doc.gov/domainname/domainname130.htm. Paper submissions
should include three paper copies and a version on diskette in the
formats specified above.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karen Rose, NTIA, (202) 482-0365.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1512; 47 U.S.C. 902(b)(2)(H); 47 U.S.C. 902
(b)(2)(I); 47 U.S.C. 902(b)(2)(M); 47 U.S.C. 904(c)(1).
I. Introduction
On July 1, 1997, The President directed the Secretary of Commerce
to privatize, increase competition in, and promote international
participation in the domain name system. Domain names are the familiar
and easy-to-remember names for Internet computers (e.g.
``www.ecommerce.gov''). They map to unique Internet Protocol (IP)
numbers (e.g., 98.37.241.30) that serve as routing addresses on the
Internet. The domain name system (DNS) translates Internet names into
the IP numbers needed for transmission of information across the
network. On July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a Request
for Comments (RFC) on DNS administration (62 FR 35896). This proposed
rule, shaped by over 430 comments received in response to the RFC,
provides notice and seeks public comment on a proposal to transfer
control of Internet domain names from government to a private,
nonprofit corporation.
II. Background
Today's Internet is an outgrowth of U.S. government investments in
packet-switching technology and communications networks carried out
under agreements with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other U.S. research
agencies. The government encouraged bottom-up development of networking
technologies through work at NSF, which established the NSFNET as a
network for research and education. The NSFNET fostered a wide range of
applications, and in 1992 the U.S. Congress gave the National Science
Foundation statutory authority to commercialize the NSFNET, which
formed the basis for today's Internet.
As a legacy, major components of the domain name system are still
performed by or subject to agreements with agencies of the U.S.
government.
A. Assignment of Numerical Addresses to Internet Users
Every Internet computer has a unique IP number. The Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), headed by Dr. Jon Postel of the
Information Sciences Institute (ISI) at the University of Southern
California, coordinates this system by allocating blocks of numerical
addresses to regional IP registries (ARIN in North America, RIPE in
Europe, and APNIC in the Asia/Pacific region), under contract with
DARPA. In turn, larger Internet service providers apply to the regional
IP registries for blocks of IP addresses. The recipients of those
address blocks then reassign addresses to smaller Internet service
providers and to end users.
B. Management of the System of Registering Names for Internet Users
The domain name space is constructed as a hierarchy. It is divided
into top-level domains (TLDs), with each TLD then divided into second-
level domains (SLDs), and so on. More than 200 national, or country-
code, TLDs (ccTLDs) are administered by their corresponding governments
or by private entities with the appropriate national government's
acquiescence. A small set of generic top-level domains (gTLDs) do not
carry any national identifier, but denote the intended function of that
portion of the domain space. For example, .com was established for
commercial users, .org for not-for-profit organizations, and .net for
network service providers. The registration and propagation of these
key gTLDs are performed by Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a Virginia-
based company, under a five-year cooperative agreement with NSF. This
agreement includes an optional ramp-down period that expires on
September 30, 1998.
C. Operation of the Root Server System
The root server system contains authoritative databases listing the
TLDs so that an Internet message can be routed to its destination.
Currently, NSI operates the ``A'' root server, which maintains the
authoritative root database and replicates changes to the other root
servers on a daily basis. Different organizations, including NSI,
operate the other 12 root servers. In total, the U.S. government plays
a direct role in the operation of half of the world's root servers.
Universal connectivity on the Internet cannot be guaranteed without a
set of authoritative and consistent roots.
D. Protocol Assignment
The Internet protocol suite, as defined by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), contains many technical parameters, including
protocol numbers, port numbers, autonomous system numbers, management
information base object identifiers and others. The common use of these
protocols by the Internet community requires that the particular values
used in these fields be assigned uniquely. Currently, IANA, under
contract with DARPA, makes these assignments and maintains a registry
of the assigned values.
III. The Need For Change
From its origins as a U.S.-based research vehicle, the Internet is
rapidly becoming an international medium for commerce, education and
communication. The traditional means
[[Page 8827]]
of organizing its technical functions need to evolve as well. The
pressures for change are coming from many different quarters:
There is widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of
competition in domain name registration.
Mechanisms for resolving conflict between trademark
holders and domain name holders are expensive and cumbersome.
Without changes, a proliferation of lawsuits could lead to
chaos as tribunals around the world apply the antitrust law and
intellectual property law of their jurisdictions to the Internet.
Many commercial interests, staking their future on the
successful growth of the Internet, are calling for a more formal and
robust management structure.
An increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside
of the U.S., and those stakeholders want a larger voice in Internet
coordination.
As Internet names increasingly have commercial value, the
decision to add new top-level domains cannot continue to be made on an
ad hoc basis by entities or individuals that are not formally
accountable to the Internet community.
As the Internet becomes commercial, it becomes
inappropriate for U.S. research agencies (NSF and DARPA) to participate
in and fund these functions.
IV. The Future Role of the U.S. Government in the DNS
On July 1, 1997, as part of the Clinton Administration's Framework
for Global Electronic Commerce, the President directed the Secretary of
Commerce to privatize, increase competition in, and promote
international participation in the domain name system.
Accordingly, on July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a
Request for Comments (RFC) on DNS administration, on behalf of an
inter-agency working group previously formed to explore the appropriate
future role of the U.S. government in the DNS. The RFC solicited public
input on issues relating to the overall framework of the DNS system,
the creation of new top-level domains, policies for registrars, and
trademark issues. During the comment period, over 430 comments were
received, amounting to some 1500 pages.1
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\1\ The RFC and comments received are available on the Internet
at the following address: .
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This discussion draft, shaped by the public input described above,
provides notice and seeks public comment on a proposal to improve the
technical management of Internet names and addresses. It does not
propose a monolithic structure for Internet governance. We doubt that
the Internet should be governed by one plan or one body or even by a
series of plans and bodies. Rather, we seek to create mechanisms to
solve a few, primarily technical (albeit critical) questions about
administration of Internet names and numbers.
We expect that this proposal will likely spark a lively debate,
requiring thoughtful analysis, and appropriate revisions. Nonetheless,
we are hopeful that reasonable consensus can be found and that, after
appropriate modifications, implementation can begin in April, 1998.
Recognizing that no solution will win universal support, the U.S.
government seeks as much consensus as possible before acting.
V. Principles for a New System
Our consultations have revealed substantial differences among
Internet stakeholders on how the domain name system should evolve.
Since the Internet is changing so rapidly, no one entity or individual
can claim to know what is best for the Internet. We certainly do not
believe that our views are uniquely prescient. Nevertheless, shared
principles have emerged from our discussions with Internet
stakeholders.
A. Stability
The U.S. government should end its role in the Internet number and
name address systems in a responsible manner. This means, above all
else, ensuring the stability of the Internet. The Internet functions
well today, but its current technical management is probably not viable
over the long term. We should not wait for it to break down before
acting. Yet, we should not move so quickly, or depart so radically from
the existing structures, that we disrupt the functioning of the
Internet. The introduction of a new system should not disrupt current
operations, or create competing root systems.
B. Competition
The Internet succeeds in great measure because it is a
decentralized system that encourages innovation and maximizes
individual freedom. Where possible, market mechanisms that support
competition and consumer choice should drive the technical management
of the Internet because they will promote innovation, preserve
diversity, and enhance user choice and satisfaction.
C. Private, Bottom-Up Coordination
Certain technical management functions require coordination. In
these cases, responsible, private-sector action is preferable to
government control. A private coordinating process is likely to be more
flexible than government and to move rapidly enough to meet the
changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. The private
process should, as far as possible, reflect the bottom-up governance
that has characterized development of the Internet to date.
D. Representation
Technical management of the Internet should reflect the diversity
of its users and their needs. Mechanisms should be established to
ensure international input in decision making.
In keeping with these principles, we divide the name and number
functions into two groups, those that can be moved to a competitive
system and those that should be coordinated. We then suggest the
creation of a representative, not-for-profit corporation to manage the
coordinated functions according to widely accepted objective criteria.
We then suggest the steps necessary to move to competitive markets in
those areas that can be market driven. Finally, we suggest a transition
plan to ensure that these changes occur in an orderly fashion that
preserves the stability of the Internet.
VI. The Proposal
A. The Coordinated Functions
Management of number addresses is best done on a coordinated basis.
As technology evolves, changes may be needed in the number allocation
system. These changes should also be undertaken in a coordinated
fashion.
Similarly, coordination of the root server network is necessary if
the whole system is to work smoothly. While day-to-day operational
tasks, such as the actual operation and maintenance of the Internet
root servers, can be contracted out, overall policy guidance and
control of the TLDs and the Internet root server system should be
vested in a single organization that is representative of Internet
users.
Finally, coordinated maintenance and dissemination of the protocol
parameters for Internet addressing will best preserve the stability and
interconnectivity of the Internet.
We propose the creation of a private, not-for-profit corporation
(the new corporation) to manage the coordinated functions in a stable
and open institutional framework. The new corporation should operate as
a private
[[Page 8828]]
entity for the benefit of the Internet as a whole. The new corporation
would have the following authority:
1. To set policy for and direct the allocation of number blocks to
regional number registries for the assignment of Internet addresses;
2. To oversee the operation of an authoritative root server system;
3. To oversee policy for determining, based on objective criteria
clearly established in the new organization's charter, the
circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the root
system; and
4. To coordinate the development of other technical protocol
parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the
Internet.
The U.S. government would gradually transfer existing IANA
functions, the root system and the appropriate databases to this new
not-for-profit corporation. This transition would commence as soon as
possible, with operational responsibility moved to the new entity by
September 30, 1998. The U.S. government would participate in policy
oversight to assure stability until the new corporation is established
and stable, phasing out as soon as possible and in no event later than
September 30, 2000. The U.S. Department of Commerce will coordinate the
U.S. government policy role. In proposing these dates, we are trying to
balance concerns about a premature U.S. government exit that turns the
domain name system over to a new and untested entity against the
concern that the U.S. government will never relinquish its current
management role.
The new corporation will be funded by domain name registries and
regional IP registries. Initially, current IANA staff will move to this
new organization to provide continuity and expertise throughout the
period of time it takes to establish the new corporation. The new
corporation should hire a chief executive officer with a background in
the corporate sector to bring a more rigorous management to the
organization than was possible or necessary when the Internet was
primarily a research medium. As these functions are now performed in
the United States, the new corporation will be headquartered in the
United States, and incorporated under U.S. law as a not-for-profit
corporation. It will, however, have and report to a board of directors
from around the world.
It is probably impossible to establish and maintain a perfectly
representative board for this new organization. The Internet community
is already extraordinarily diverse and likely to become more so over
time. Nonetheless, the organization and its board must derive
legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders. Since the
organization will be concerned mainly with numbers, names and
protocols, its board should represent membership organizations in each
of these areas, as well as the direct interests of Internet users.
The board of directors for the new corporation should be balanced
to equitably represent the interests of IP number registries, domain
name registries, domain name registrars, the technical community, and
Internet users (commercial, not-for-profit, and individuals). Officials
of governments or intergovernmental organizations should not serve on
the board of the new corporation. Seats on the initial board might be
allocated as follows:
Three directors from a membership association of regional
number registries, representing three different regions of the world.
Today this would mean one each from ARIN, APNIC and RIPE. As additional
regional number registries are added, board members could be designated
on a rotating basis or elected by a membership organization made up of
regional registries. ARIN, RIPE and APNIC are open membership
organizations that represent entities with large blocks of numbers.
They have the greatest stake in and knowledge of the number address
system. They are also representative internationally.
Two members designated by the Internet Architecture Board
(IAB), an international membership board that represents the technical
community of the Internet.
Two members designated by a membership association (to be
created) representing domain name registries and registrars.
Seven members designated by a membership association (to be
created) representing Internet users. At least one of those board seats
could be designated for an individual or entity engaged in non-
commercial, not-for-profit use of the Internet, and one for individual
end users. The remaining seats could be filled by commercial users,
including trademark holders.
The CEO of the new corporation would serve on the board of
directors.
The new corporation's processes should be fair, open and pro-
competitive, protecting against capture by a narrow group of
stakeholders. Its decision-making processes should be sound and
transparent; the bases for its decisions should be recorded and made
publicly available. Super-majority or even consensus requirements may
be useful to protect against capture by a self-interested faction. The
new corporation's charter should provide a mechanism whereby its
governing body will evolve to reflect changes in the constituency of
Internet stakeholders. The new corporation should establish an open
process for the presentation of petitions to expand board
representation.
In performing the functions listed above, the new corporation will
act much like a standard-setting body. To the extent that the new
corporation operates in an open and pro-competitive manner, its actions
will withstand antitrust scrutiny. Its standards should be reasonably
based on, and no broader than necessary to promote its legitimate
coordinating objectives. Under U.S. law, a standard-setting body can
face antitrust liability if it is dominated by an economically
interested entity, or if standards are set in secret by a few leading
competitors. But appropriate processes and structure will minimize the
possibility that the body's actions will be, or will appear to a court
to be, anti-competitive.
B. The Competitive Functions
The system for registering second-level domain names and the
management of the TLD registries should become competitive and market-
driven.
In this connection, we distinguish between registries and
registrars. A ``registry,'' as we use the term, is responsible for
maintaining a TLD's zone files, which contain the name of each SLD in
that TLD and each SLD's corresponding IP number. Under the current
structure of the Internet, a given TLD can have no more than one
registry. A ``registrar'' acts as an interface between domain-name
holders and the registry, providing registration and value-added
services. It submits to the registry zone file information and other
data (including contact information) for each of its customers in a
single TLD. Currently, NSI acts as both the exclusive registry and as
the exclusive registrar for .com, .net, .org, and .edu.
Both registry and registrar functions could be operated on a
competitive basis. Just as NSI acts as the registry for .com, .net, and
.org, other companies could manage registries with different TLDs such
as .vend or .store. Registrars could provide the service of obtaining
domain names for customers in any gTLD. Companies that design Web sites
for customers might, for example, provide registration as an adjunct to
other services. Other companies may perform this function as a stand-
alone business.
There appears to be strong consensus that, at least at this time,
domain name
[[Page 8829]]
registration--the registrar function--should be competitive. There is
disagreement, however, over the wisdom of promoting competition at the
registry level.
Some have made a strong case for establishing a market-driven
registry system. Competition among registries would allow registrants
to choose among TLDs rather than face a single option. Competing TLDs
would seek to heighten their efficiency, lower their prices, and
provide additional value-added services. Investments in registries
could be recouped through branding and marketing. The efficiency,
convenience, and service levels associated with the assignment of names
could ultimately differ from one TLD registry to another. Without these
types of market pressures, they argue, registries will have very little
incentive to innovate.
Others feel strongly, however, that if multiple registries are to
exist, they should be undertaken on a not-for-profit basis. They argue
that lack of portability among registries (that is, the fact that users
cannot change registries without adjusting at least part of their
domain name string) could create lock-in problems and harm consumers.
For example, a registry could induce users to register in a top-level
domain by charging very low prices initially and then raise prices
dramatically, knowing that name holders will be reluctant to risk
established business by moving to a different top-level domain.
We concede that switching costs and lock-in could produce the
scenario described above. On the other hand, we believe that market
mechanisms may well discourage this type of behavior. On balance, we
believe that consumers will benefit from competition among market
oriented registries, and we thus support limited experimentation with
competing registries during the transition to private sector
administration of the domain name system.
C. The Creation of New gTLDs
Internet stakeholders disagree about who should decide when a new
top-level domain can be added and how that decision should be made.
Some believe that anyone should be allowed to create a top-level domain
registry. They argue that the market will decide which will succeed and
which will not. Others believe that such a system would be too chaotic
and would dramatically increase customer confusion. They argue that it
would be far more complex technically, because the root server system
would have to point to a large number of top-level domains that were
changing with great frequency. They also point out that it would be
much more difficult for trademark holders to protect their trademarks
if they had to police a large number of top-level domains.
All these arguments have merit, but they all depend on facts that
only further experience will reveal. At least in the short run, a
prudent concern for the stability of the system requires that expansion
of gTLDs proceed at a deliberate and controlled pace to allow for
evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs and well-reasoned evolution
of the domain space. The number of new top-level domains should be
large enough to create competition among registries and to enable the
new corporation to evaluate the functioning, in the new environment, of
the root server system and the software systems that enable shared
registration. At the same time, it should not be so large as to
destabilize the Internet.
We believe that during the transition to private management of the
DNS, the addition of up to five new registries would be consistent with
these goals. At the outset, we propose that each new registry be
limited to a single top-level domain. During this period, the new
corporation should evaluate the effects that the addition of new gTLDs
have on the operation of the Internet, on users, and on trademark
holders. After this transition, the new corporation will be in a better
position to decide whether or when the introduction of additional gTLDs
is desirable.
Individual companies and consortia alike may seek to operate
specific generic top-level domains. Competition will take place on two
levels. First, there will be competition among different generic top-
level domains. Second, registrars will compete to register clients into
these generic top-level domains. By contrast, existing national
registries will continue to administer country-code top-level domains
if these national government seek to assert those rights. Changes in
the registration process for these domains are up to the registries
administering them and their respective national governments.
Some have called for the creation of a more descriptive system of
top-level domains based on industrial classifications or some other
easy to understand schema. They suggest that having multiple top-level
domains is already confusing and that the addition of new generic TLDs
will make it more difficult for users to find the companies they are
seeking.
Market driven systems result in innovation and greater consumer
choice and satisfaction in the long run. We expect that in the future,
directory services of various sorts will make it easy for users to find
the sites they seek regardless of the number of top-level domains.
Attempts to impose too much central order risk stifling a medium like
the Internet that is decentralized by nature and thrives on freedom and
innovation.
D. The Trademark Dilemma
It is important to keep in mind that trademark/domain name disputes
arise very rarely on the Internet today. NSI, for example, has
registered millions of domain names, only a tiny fraction of which have
been challenged by a trademark owner. But where a trademark is
unlawfully used as a domain name, consumers may be misled about the
source of the product or service offered on the Internet, and trademark
owners may not be able to protect their rights without very expensive
litigation.
For cyberspace to function as an effective commercial market,
businesses must have confidence that their trademarks can be protected.
On the other hand, management of the Internet must respond to the needs
of the Internet community as a whole, and not trademark owners
exclusively. The balance we strike is to provide trademark holders with
the same rights they have in the physical world, to ensure
transparency, to guarantee a dispute resolution mechanism with resort
to a court system, and to add new top-level domains carefully during
the transition to private sector coordination of the domain name
system.
There are certain steps that could be taken in the application
process that would not be difficult for an applicant, but that would
make the trademark owner's job easier. For instance, gTLD registrants
could supply basic information--including the applicant's name and
sufficient contact information to be able to locate the applicant or
its representative. To deter the pirating of domain names, the registry
could also require applicants to certify that it knows of no entity
with superior rights in the domain name it seeks to register.
The job of policing trademarks could be considerably easier if
domain name databases were readily searchable through a common
interface to determine what names are registered, who holds those
domain names, and how to contact a domain name holder. Many trademark
holders find the current registration search tool, who is, too limited
in its functioning to be effective for this purpose. A more robust and
flexible search tool, which features multiple field or string searching
and retrieves similar names, could be
[[Page 8830]]
employed or developed to meet the needs of trademark holders. The
databases also could be kept up to date by a requirement that domain
name registrants maintain up-to-date contact information.
Mechanisms that allow for on-line dispute resolution could provide
an inexpensive and efficient alternative to litigation for resolving
disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. A swift
dispute resolution process could provide for the temporary suspension
of a domain name registration if an adversely affected trademark holder
objects within a short time, e.g. 30 days, of the initial registration.
We seek comment on whether registries should be required to resolve
disputes within a specified period of time after an opposition is
filed, and if so, how long that period should be.
Trademark holders have expressed concern that domain name
registrants in faraway places may be able to infringe their rights with
no convenient jurisdiction available in which the trademark owner could
file suit to protect those rights. At the time of registration,
registrants could agree that, in the event of a trademark dispute
involving the name registered, jurisdiction would lie where the
registry is domiciled, where the registry database in maintained, or
where the ``A'' root server is maintained. We seek comment on this
proposal, as well as suggestions for how such jurisdictional provisions
could be implemented.
Trademark holders have also called for the creation of some
mechanism for ``clearing'' trademarks, especially famous marks, across
a range of gTLDs. Such mechanisms could reduce trademark conflict
associated with the addition of new gTLDs. Again, we seek comment on
this pr