IP
Justice Report
on the
WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights
Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting
Organizations
Eleventh Session, Geneva, 7 – 9 June 2004
“Excessive Rights for Broadcasting
Corporations
Threatens Public Domain and
Technological Innovation”
By IP Justice Executive Director Robin Gross (robin@ipjustice.org)
www.ipjustice.org/
Contents of Chairman's Consolidated
Text
Article 1
Relation to Other Conventions and Treaties
Article 2 Definitions
Article 3 Scope of Application
Article 4 Beneficiaries of Protection
Article 5 National Treatment
Article 6 Right of Retransmission
Article 7 Right of Communication to the Public
Article 8 Right of Fixation
Article 9 Right of Reproduction
Article 10 Right of Distribution
Article 11 Right of Transmission following
Fixation
Article 12 Right of Making Available of Fixed
Broadcasting
Article 13 Protection in Relation to Signals
Prior to Broadcasting
Article 14 Limitations and Exceptions
Article 15 Term of Protection
Article 16 Obligations Concerning Technological
Measures
Article 17 Concerning Rights Management
Information
Article 18 Formalities
Article 19 Reservations
Article 20 Application in Time
Article 21 Provisions on Enforcement of Rights
Article 22 Assembly
Article 23 International Bureau
Article 24 Eligibility for Becoming Party to the
Treaty
Article 25 Rights and Obligations under the
Treaty
Article 26 Signature of the Treaty
Article 27 Entry into Force of the Treaty
Article 28 Effective Date of Becoming Party to
the Treaty
Article 29 Denunciation of the Treaty
Article 30 Languages of the Treaty
Article 31 Depository
Article 1 – Relation to Other
Conventions of Treaties
Article 1 states that this treaty shall not
derogate from existing obligations under international treaties.
Alternative B to Article 1 is the better approach since it contains a
“non-prejudice clause” modeled on the Rome Convention and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Importantly, it
includes a “no-connection and non-prejudice clause” concerning any
other treaties, making it a free-standing treaty, with its substance
not linked to any other treaty.
Article 2 -
Definitions
Article 2 contains definitions of the key terms
used in the instrument.
(a) “Broadcasting” means the wireless transmission
to the public of sounds and/or images, including transmissions via
satellite or other radio waves that propagate freely in space.
Under the definition, no transmissions via wire are considered
“broadcasting. The wireless transmission of encrypted signals is
considered “broadcasting” where the means for decrypting are provided
to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its
consent. “Transmissions over computer networks” are specifically
excluded from the definition of “broadcasting” in order to make clear
that computer network transmissions, even when transmitted by wireless
means, are not intended to qualify as “broadcasting”. Note that
Alternative C below, would however, extend the treaty to include
Internet transmissions of audio and video as “webcasting”.
Importantly, the Text's definition for “retransmission” includes all
redistributions of broadcasted audio and/or video by any means
including Internet transmissions, broadening the scope of the treaty
immensely, despite the seemingly narrow definition of broadcasting and
without regard to whether webcasting is ultimately included within the
treaty.
An even broader definition for the term
“broadcasting” was proposed by the European Community and others that
would have included not only wireless transmissions, but also
transmissions via wire, “including by cable or satellite”. The
Consolidated Text chose the narrower definition for “broadcasting” but
then added the term “cablecasting” to the instrument, which includes
transmissions by wire, including cable. By providing
separate definitions for “broadcasting” and “cablecasting”, the
treaty's scope is widened exactly the same as if it had adopted the
broader definition of “broadcasting”.
(b) “Broadcasting organization” is defined as (i)
a legal entity that (ii) takes the initiative and (iii) has the
responsibility for the transmission and (iv) the “assembly and
scheduling of the content of the transmission”. This definition
was proposed by the United States, Egypt, and Kenya. The stated
object of regulation in the new instrument is the broadcast, that is,
“the program-carrying signal constituting the transmission”.
(c) “Cablecasting” is confined to transmissions by
wire. Under the Consolidated Text's definition, no wireless
transmissions, including by satellite, are considered
“cablecasting.” The transmission by wire of encrypted signals is
considered “cablecasting” where the means for decrypting are provided
to the public by the cablecasting organization or with its
consent. “Transmissions over computer networks” are specifically
excluded from the definition of “cablecasting” as well under the
Consolidated Text. Note however, that Alternative C (described
more fully below) would extend the treaty to include Internet
transmissions of audio and video as “webcasting”.
(d) “Retransmission” is defined dangerously broad
in the Chairman's Consolidated Text. It embraces all forms of
retransmissions by any means, including by wire or wirelessly, or a
combination thereof. The open-ended definition covers
re-broadcasting and re-transmission by wire or cable, and even over
computer networks. This includes simultaneously sharing
television programs and broadcasted music using Peer-2-Peer (P2P)
file-sharing software.
Including the retransmission of information over
computer networks within the definition of retransmission dramatically
enlarges the scope of the treaty's application. It extends
the treaty's application far outside the realm of traditional
broadcasting and into the activity and lives of ordinary
consumers. Such a broad definition far exceeds existing
international treaty obligations and threatens to chill freedom of
expression by treating ordinary consumers as dangerous outlaws.
The definition is confined to simultaneous
retransmissions only, but protection extends to subsequent
retransmissions since non-simultaneous transmissions only take place
from a fixation of the original transmission and such retransmissions
are considered new transmissions that are covered under the text.
(e) “Communication to the public” means making the
transmissions audible and/or visible in places accessible to the
public. It includes the reception of a signal and projection of
its program to the public, such as in a café, hotel lobby,
fairground, on a screen at a cinema, or a radio or television set, or
in other places open to the public.
The Consolidated Text's explanatory notes claim
that this definition refers to public performances, where an audience
is present in the place where the performance takes place.
However, the text's proposed definition is unclear and arguably broad
enough to include transmissions made via the Internet from one home to
another, since the Internet is a “place accessible to the
public”.
(f) “Fixation” is broadly defined as the
embodiment of sounds and/or images using whatever means and whatever
medium. The definition does not qualify or quantify the duration
of the life of the embodiment necessary to be considered a
“fixation”. And there are no conditions regarding the requisite
permanence or stability of the embodiment.
The definition of fixation is particularly
problematic because it assumes that a broadcast signal can be “fixed”,
when actually, broadcast signals dissolve when they reach solid matter,
and thus, cannot, as a law of simple physics, become “fixed”. The
Chairman's crucial misunderstanding about the nature of the technology
is one of the biggest problems with the Consolidated Text, since so
many new rights are predicated upon this erroneous notion.
(g) “Webcasting” is broadly defined as the making
accessible to the public of transmissions of sounds and/or images by
wire or wireless means over a computer network at substantially the
same time. Proposed by the United States, this definition is
included in the Consolidated Text as Alternative C due to the enormous
opposition by most countries to include webcasting within the scope of
a broadcasting treaty. The United States continues to pressure
other countries to adopt this alternative however. Such a broad
definition would extend the treaty's application to include virtually
all Internet transmissions of music and video programming.
Such an extension threatens freedom of expression
and stifles the growth of the public domain by creating enormous
barriers to an otherwise robust exchange of creativity and
knowledge. No other international treaties require countries' to
regulate webcasting in the manner proposed by the United States in this
WIPO Broadcasting Treaty. Alternative C attempts to create
substantive law on a new issue for which there is no agreement in the
international community and should be deleted altogether.
Article 3 – Scope
of Application
Article 3 sets the parameters for the treaty's
scope and has been the most hotly debated issue before the Standing
Committee. Paragraph (1) of Article 3 provides for the treaty's
application to the area of broadcasting. Paragraph (2) extends
the treaty's application to cablecasting as well.
Article 3's Paragraph (3) is where the
controversial issue of webcasting is being played out in the
treaty. Two alternatives are proposed for Paragraph (3) that
would extend its scope beyond traditional broadcasting and cablecasting
and into the new frontier of cyberspace. Proposed by the European
Community, Alternative E would extend the rights of broadcasting
organizations to the simultaneous and unchanged webcasting of their own
broadcasts (“simulcasting”). Under this proposal, Internet
transmissions of television programs, movies, and music that are
unedited and made accessible online at the same time as the authorized
transmission would fall within the scope of this treaty.
The second option for Paragraph (3) to Article 3
of the Consolidated Text was proposed by the United States and is much
broader in scope. Alternative F proposes to give to webcasting
organizations the same rights that are afforded to broadcasting and
cablecasting organizations. Creating a whole new set of rights
for webcasting organizations goes far beyond the original scope of this
treaty and would stifle innovation and free expression.
Alternative G in Paragraph 3 recognizes the lack of support in the
international community to extend this treaty into webcasting
activities, which are beyond the traditional areas of broadcasting and
cablecasting, and thus proposes that no such provision be
adopted. Alternative G should be adopted and the issue of
webcasting should be taken up in a separate instrument (if at all).
Paragraph (4) to Article 3 would exclude certain
transmissions from the treaty's scope. It excludes retransmission
in theory, but since retransmissions are considered new transmissions
covered by the treaty, the exclusion is of little practical
significance. It also excludes any transmissions where the time
of transmission and place of reception may be individually chosen by
members of the public. This means that all on-demand and
interactive transmissions are excluded from the scope of this
treaty. The proposed definition of webcasting does not cover
these transmissions either.
Article 4 –
Beneficiaries of Protection
Article 4 establishes that rights are granted to
broadcasting organizations that are nationals of other countries that
are also signatories to this treaty. National treatment is thus
afforded based on whether the broadcasting organization is situated in
another Contracting Party Nation, or if the broadcasts are transmitted
from another Contracting Party Nation. Alternative H would allow
signatories to set as a condition for protection that the headquarters
of the broadcaster and the transmitter be situated in the same country,
thus providing some limitation to foreign control over the domestic use
of broadcasts.
Article 5 –
National Treatment
Article 5 sets forth provisions concerning
national treatment and the Consolidated Text provides two
alternatives. Alternative J limits the obligation to accord
national treatment to only those exclusive rights specifically granted
in the Broadcasting Treaty, following the approach of the WPPT.
Alternative K, proposed by the United States and Egypt, would create
broad rights for nationals that they “do now or may hereafter grant”
besides the rights specifically granted in the treaty. The broad
and speculative nature of Alternative K, makes Alternative J more
appealing for Article 5.
Article 6 – Right
of Retransmission
Article 6 provides broadcasting organizations with
an exclusive right to authorize the retransmission by any means of
their broadcasts. The phrase “by any means” creates a dangerously
broad grant of control over all retransmissions, including
rebroadcasting and retransmission by wire, cable, or even over computer
networks. This grant is broad enough to include a consumer who is
sending a public domain movie through the Internet for non-commercial
purposes. By including the redistribution through the Internet of
broadcast media, the proposal goes well beyond its stated goal of
applying to broadcasting organizations and regulates an enormous
breadth of ordinary consumer activity, endangering freedom of
expression on the Internet.
And this grant would give the traditional
broadcasting industry a competitive advantage over webcasters and other
“new-media” retransmitters who discover new and innovative ways of
providing entertainment to consumers but will be prevented from doing
so because this broad grant forecloses all future means of
redistribution that is yet to be discovered.
Article 6 also provides broadcasting organizations
with higher levels of protection over broadcasts than the law gives to
the actual creators of the content being broadcast. Canada
proposed a reservation to Article 6 out of concern that it creates “a
situation where the level of protection of broadcasts would exceed the
rights of the rightsholders of the content being broadcast.”
Article
7 – Right of Communication
Article 7 provides two competing alternatives to
create an exclusive right of communication to the public for
broadcasting organizations. In either alternative, the right of
communication applies to broadcasts made in places accessible to the
public for a fee. Alternative L would recognize this exclusive
right in an unconditional way. Alternative M provides for the
possibility of limits based on domestic law or by reservation of
applicability. A right of communication is broader than the
rights granted to copyright holders under US copyright law, which only
regulates public distributions and public performances. Granting
a right of communication clearly impacts freedom of expression rights
by preventing the communication of an expressed idea.
Article 8 – Right
of Fixation
Article 8 grants broadcasting organizations the
exclusive right of authorizing the fixation of their broadcasts.
This is an unnecessary and superfluous grant since broadcasting
organizations that already own the content may fix the broadcast as
they wish. Those who did not create the program are not deserving
of a separate right of fixation for their signals.
In many places throughout the proposal including
Article 8, the Consolidated Text blurs the distinction between
copyright protection over the content of a broadcast and a right of
fixation over a broadcast signal. It proposes to grant
copyright-like protections to a broadcast signal, something outside the
scope of copyright protection since it lacks originality and
creativity. The fixation of a signal in and of itself is
meaningless, valueless. It is always the content of the signal
that is the object of protection under intellectual property
laws. Granting a new right to fix a signal expands the rights
given to broadcasters in an unprecedented way. A right of
fixation must be excluded from any treaty designed to protect broadcast
signals, and not creative works themselves.
Importantly, broadcast signals exist in the air
and "dissolve" upon reception, so they cannot be “fixed” as
contemplated by the Consolidated Text. As a result, much of
this treaty proposal is predicated upon a fundamental misunderstanding
of the technology and the laws of physics, and thus will only lead to
greater problems in the future unless corrected now.
Article 9 – Right
of Reproduction
Article 9 creates a new right of reproduction for
broadcasting organizations over the reproductions of fixations of their
broadcasts. For the same reasons described above for rejecting
Article 8's right of fixation, Article 9's right of reproduction should
be deleted from a treaty intended to protect broadcast signals rather
than the programs. Such a right, even if deserving and
technologically possible (which it is not as explained above), is
outside the scope of copyright protection. Rather, a
“signals-centric” approach, such as that provided for by the Satellites
Convention is the better approach to protecting the legitimate rights
of broadcasting organizations to recoup their investment in programming.
Article 9 provides two alternatives that prohibit
copies of a broadcast's fixation. Alternative N would grant the
right of fixation as an unqualified intellectual property-type
exclusive right for direct or indirect fixations. Alternative O
goes even further and gives broadcasting organizations the “right to
prohibit” copies of programs and the “right of authorizing” copies even
if they were lawfully made under a recognized limitation to the
broadcaster's exclusive right. By breaking from the Satellites
Convention's “signals-centric” approach, both alternatives to create a
new right of reproduction for broadcasting organizations should be
rejected from the proposal.
Article 10 –
Right of Distribution
Article 10 provides broadcasting organizations
with a new right regarding the distribution of originals or copies of
fixations of their broadcasts and reproductions of their
broadcasts. Once again, the Consolidated Text departs from the
Satellites Convention's “signal-centric” approach and attempts to
create copyright-like protections for items that do not qualify as
creative works, such as broadcast signals. And also again, this
article is erroneously predicated upon “bad science” since it
erroneously presumes that a broadcast signal can be fixed, when it
cannot.
Article 10 offers to two alternatives.
Alternative P would grant broadcasting organizations the exclusive
right to make available to the public originals and copies of fixations
of their broadcasts. Paragraph (2) embodies copyright law's
traditional “First Sale Legal Doctrine” which terminates an author's
right to control distribution of a work after its first sale to the
public. This paragraph leaves it up to countries to determine the
conditions for exhaustion of the right of distribution after the first
sale or other transfer of ownership of the broadcast's fixation.
Alternative Q reflects proposals by the United States and Egypt to
grant to broadcasting organizations the right to prohibit the
distribution of their broadcasts and additionally a new right to
prohibit the importation of reproductions of unauthorized fixations of
their broadcasts. None of the traditional limitations to
rightsholders' right to control distribution, such as the “First Sale
Rule” are provided for by this Alternative. The delegates should
delete Article 10 for reasons described above, or at the very least,
reject Alternative Q.
Article 11 –
Right of Transmission Following Fixation
Article 11 grants broadcasting organizations the
exclusive right to authorize the transmission of their broadcasts
following its fixation. This broad right of authorizing
transmissions covers all transmissions, including broadcasting,
cablecasting and webcasting, following a broadcast's fixation.
Together with the definition for retransmission in Article 2d, this new
right drastically broadens the scope of the treaty's application since
any copy of a broadcast that is distributed over the Internet
(including through P2P file-sharing networks) would be prohibited.
As explained above, this Article also takes the
wrong approach by attempting to provide copyright-like rights to the
fixation of broadcast signals, something outside the scope of
copyright's protection and because it is contrary to the laws of
physics in that it presumes that a broadcast signal can be fixed at
all. Accordingly, Article 11 also grants improper rights and
should be deleted in its entirety.
Article 12 –
Right of Making Available of Fixed Broadcasts
Article 12 provides broadcasting organizations
with rights concerning making available to the public, by wire or
wireless means, of their fixed broadcasts such that members of the
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen
by them. Article 12 would prevent someone from storing
broadcasted programs on a computer that is accessible via a network,
including a “shared directory” of a P2P software program. Even if
no distribution is ever made of this broadcast, a person is still
liable to the broadcasting organization under this proposal, simply for
storing the file in such a manner.
The two alternatives offered in the Consolidated
Text take a slightly different approach. Alternative R
gives broadcasting organizations an “exclusive right of authorizing the
making available to the public of their broadcasts from
fixations.” Alternative S would grant broadcasting organizations
the “right to prohibit the making available to the public of their
broadcasts from unauthorized fixations.” Article 12 allows broadcasting
organizations to prevent other rightsholders (such the performers of
the underlying program) from making their performances available for
viewing.
Article 12 creates a new right to control material
that is already adequately protected under copyright, increasing the
public's burden to use programming. Furthermore, as explained
above, this new right makes little sense since a broadcast signal
cannot physically become “fixed” as contemplated by this article.
Article 13
- Protection in Relation to Signals Prior to Broadcasting
Article 13 requires countries to grant “adequate
and effective legal protection” against the theft of “pre-broadcast
signals”. Pre-broadcast signals are signals that are not intended
for direct reception by the public by the broadcasting organization and
is often footage that is not included in the final programming.
Although there has been no showing for the need to create a new and
separate right over “B-roll” footage, the Consolidated Text permits
countries to grant this new right to both the receiving broadcasting
organization and/or the transmitting broadcasting organization.
Hence in addition to permission from the actual creator of a program, a
person would also need to pay for licenses from two separate
broadcasting organizations to use the content, taking the level of
“protection” to an insane and unprecedented level. Since this
Article proposes to create this separate and distinct right without any
showing of its need on either end of the transmission, this Article
should be deleted in its entirety.
Article 14 –
Limitations and Exceptions
Article 14 sets forth the limitations of and
exceptions to the rights of broadcasting organizations under this
treaty. Paragraph (1) was based on Rome Convention principles,
and permits signatories to provide for the same kinds of limitations
and exceptions for broadcasts that their national law provides for
under copyright.
These domestic law limitations and
exceptions to the rights of broadcasting organizations are confined by
Paragraph (2) however, which contains a three-step test that was
originally established in the Berne Convention. Countries must
confine any national law limitations and exceptions to “certain special
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the broadcast
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
broadcasting organization”.
The United States and Egypt proposed Alternative T
or Paragraph (3) to Article 14 that would allow countries to maintain
national law limitations and exceptions concerning noncommercial
broadcasts only if they were in force by the date of the treaty's
diplomatic conference.
Article 14 must permit a broad range of
limitations and exceptions to the rights of broadcasting organizations
that adequately take into account the legitimate interests of
consumers, artists, webcasters, and other members of the public.
The ability for countries to shape their national laws as suits their
needs should not be narrowly confined or boxed in by over-reaching
international instruments such as this treaty. Rather, there must
be adequate breathing space to account for all the new uses and
possibilities that technology creates and the legitimate interests of
third parties in the creation of limitations and exceptions to
exclusive rights. And better protection for noncommercial
broadcasting organizations should be included in the proposal to permit
the recognition of future limitations and exceptions as their need
arises.
Article 15 – Term
of Protection
Article 15 sets forth the term of protection to be
granted to broadcasting organizations as 50 years from the end of the
year in which the broadcast took place. This is a substantial
increase from countries' existing international obligations under the
Rome Convention, which allows countries to grant a term of 20 years of
protection for broadcasts. Singapore proposed a period of
protection of 20 years computed from the year in which the broadcast
first took place, but this was not provided as an alternative in the
Consolidated Text.
A term of 50 years far surpasses the amount of
time after which a broadcasting organization recoups its investment in
a program. Indeed, a 50-year term far exceeds the marketable life
span for the vast majority of broadcasts. While artists and
performers have been granted terms of 50 years or more in the past,
they are the creators. This is an important distinction.
Broadcasting organizations are several layers removed from the creation
of programs; they only transmit the programs, and thus do not need the
same level of economic incentive as creators are granted under
copyright. Even the current international standard for
broadcasting organizations under the Rome Convention of a 20-year term
far exceeds the amount of time needed for broadcasting organizations to
recoup their investment in a broadcast. Granting excessive
protection, turns copyright law's principles on their head, restricting
the amount of creativity and knowledge accessible to the public.
The burden should be on those wishing to increase
the term of protection to demonstrate that the increase is in the
public interest. No attempt has been made in this case to justify
the Consolidated Text's proposal to more than double the current
international standard for a broadcasting organization's term of
protection.
Delegates should reject this massive “land grab”
by broadcasting organizations to extend the term of protection well
beyond a reasonable period. Article 15 should limit the term of
protection to only that period of time that is necessary for a
broadcasting organization to recoup its investment in the program and
no more.
Article 16 –
Obligations Concerning Technological Measures
Article 16 requires countries to pass
anti-circumvention laws, similar to the United States' controversial
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which forbids bypassing
restrictions on DVDs, CDs, eBooks and other entertainment. This
treaty proposes to similarly grant to broadcasting organizations the
right to prevent anyone from bypassing technological restrictions
placed on broadcast signals.
Perhaps among the most dangerous provisions in the
entire treaty proposal, is Alternative V, which outlaws broadcast
decryption activities. Subparagraph (2)(i) proposes to
specifically forbid the decryption of an encrypted program-carrying
signal. This unqualified ban on decryption would interfere with a
wide range of legitimate decryption activities. It bans certain
cryptography research, important computer security testing, and a whole
host of other socially beneficial activities, including engaging in
fair use of broadcasted programming.
Subparagraph 2(ii) broadly outlaws receiving and
communicating an encrypted broadcast to the public that has been
decrypted without the express authorization of the broadcasting
organization that emitted it. It mandates that countries
accommodate a broadcast flag that would require all entertainment
receiving devices to obey encoded technological restrictions
controlling the use of the broadcast. Controversial and unpopular
with consumers, broadcast flags are used to prevent people from
lawfully recording television programming and engaging in private uses
of media. This provision threatens to interfere with education,
research and other noncommercial uses of broadcast programming.
Consumers can be prevented from exercising their fair use rights to
“time-shift” television programs or “space-shift” music and other
entertainment as they have in the past. Trampling on consumers'
traditional rights, this provision would give broadcasting
organizations enormous control over an individual's personal experience
of entertainment and information.
Subparagraph 2(iii) of Alternative V goes the
furthest and would forbid any participation in the manufacture,
importation, sale or any other act that makes available a device or
system capable of decrypting an encrypted broadcast or that could help
another to decrypt a broadcast.
This sweeping ban on technology is so broad that
it would outlaw personal computers, since computers are devices capable
of decrypting an encrypted broadcast.
It would also outlaw much computer software,
technical papers, and other speech and information that could help
another to bypass a broadcast's technical restrictions. Proposed
by Switzerland, subparagraph 2(iii) additionally prohibits the
publication of results of computer security testing, speech about
certain cryptographic systems, and other speech that describes the
workings of signals technology, chilling freedom of expression and
weakening the public's security in such systems.
Similar anti-circumvention measures in the US DMCA
of 1998 have already been shown to chill freedom of expression, stifle
scientific research, prevent competition and chokehold technological
innovation, both in the US as well as abroad. Alternative W
recognizes the danger to civil liberties and innovation presented by
Alternative V and thus provides for “no such provision”. Article
16's obligations concerning technological measures should be rejected
in their entirety since they have been shown to be ineffective in
helping artists and particularly dangerous to the public where similar
laws have been enforced.
Article 17 –
Obligations Concerning Rights Management Information
Article 17 is also similar to provisions found in
the US DMCA and dangerous for the same reasons given for Article
16. Article 17 would ban the removal or alteration of any
electronic rights management information in the broadcast or
signal.&nbs