Responses to articles on my work

This page is mostly for brief responses to published or forthcoming articles that discuss my work. I've starred [*] the more technical entries so nonphilosophers can skip them. (The first entry is probably the best place for nonphilosophers to start.) These responses are "unofficial", but if you'd like to use them in an article, feel free to ask. See also online discussions of my work for some further papers and other discussion (without responses).

Table of contents: A link on the author's name goes to an entry further down on this page.

Other articles: Some other published or presented articles addressing my work, which I may or may not respond to at some point:


Journal of Consciousness Studies symposium on the "hard problem". (Articles by Baars, Bilodeau, Churchland, Clark, Clarke, Crick & Koch, Dennett, Hameroff & Penrose, Hardcastle, Hodgson, Hut & Shepard, Libet, Lowe, MacLennan, McGinn, Mills, O'Hara & Scutt, Price, Robinson, Rosenberg, Seager, Shear, Stapp, Varela, Velmans, Warner.)

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research symposium on The Conscious Mind. (Articles by Hill & McLaughlin, Loar, Shoemaker, Yablo.)

Reviews of The Conscious Mind.

Katalin Balog, Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Philosophical Review108:497-528, 1999.

Tim Bayne, Chalmers on the justification of phenomenal judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:407-19.

*George Bealer, Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance. In (T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mark Bishop, Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism. In (J. Preston and J.M. Bishop, eds) Views into the Chinese Room. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mark Bishop, Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers. Consciousness and Cognition, 11:642-52, 2002.

*Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108:1-46, 1999.

*Andrew Botterell, Conceiving what is not there. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:21-42, 2001.

*David Braddon-Mitchell. Qualia and analytic conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100:111-35, 2003.

*Anthony Brueckner. Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism. Analysis 61:187-93, 2001.

*Alex Byrne, Cosmic hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives 13:347-83, 1999.

*Alex Byrne, Chalmers on epistemic content. SOFIA conference on Metaphysics of Mind, December 2001.

*Alex Byrne, Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110:199-240, 2002.

Alex Byrne and Ned Hall, Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics. Philosophy of Science 66:370-90, 1999.