Frankish, Keith
(2007).
The anti-zombie argument.
Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229),
pp. 650–666.
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| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: |
dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x |
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Abstract
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.
| Item Type: |
Journal Article
|
| Copyright Holders: |
2007 The Author |
| ISSN: |
0031-8094 |
| Keywords: |
consciousness; zombie argument; zombies; conceivability; physicalism; property dualism |
| Academic Unit/Department: |
Arts > Philosophy |
| Item ID: |
2191 |
| Depositing User: |
Keith Frankish
|
| Date Deposited: |
29 May 2007 |
| Last Modified: |
01 Oct 2012 20:24 |
| URI: |
oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/2191 |
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