Home >> Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 1

The bounds of cognition

Authors: Adams F.1; Aizawa K.2

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 1, 1 March 2001 , pp. 43-64(22)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranialism about the cognitive.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 2: Department of Philosophy, Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA 71134

Publication date: 2001-03-01

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