Incredible! The State Department has released six years of hourly PM2.5 data from the US Embassy in Beijing. The data is actually wonderfully well-organized (kudos to whoever formatted it and prepared it for release!), and is just begging to be dug through. Here are some initial discoveries and thoughts based on a few hours of playing around with the data. (See also some good initial analysis from Wayne Ma/WSJ here and here.)

The Dataset
The dataset contains nearly 50,000 hourly readings from April 8, 2008, to March 31, 2014. There are some gaps in the coverage, but overall the data are fairly comprehensive. (It’s also clear that the reliability of the monitor – or maybe the reliability of maintenance – improved over time.) The data are exclusively hourly PM2.5 readings from the single monitor at the US Embassy. Because the data are in hourly concentrations of PM2.5, they must be processed into daily average concentrations and then converted to AQI. There are no ozone data, nor data from other monitors around the country or world. (Yet.)

The Best and the Worst
- Best hour: 9/28/2012 at 9am and 2pm: 0 ug/m3. Astonishing!
- Best day: 9/28/2012: 3 ug/m3
- Worst hour: 1/23/2012 at midnight: 994 ug/m3
- Worst day: 1/12/2013: 569 ug/m3
- Biggest single-hour change: 11pm to midnight, 1/22-23/2012: +769 ug/m3
- Longest streak of Unhealthy air (>150 ug/m3): 161 hours (2/19-26/2014)

Yearly Averages
The following figure shows Beijing’s yearly average PM2.5 levels according to the US Embassy monitor. Also shown on the figure are the US annual average PM2.5 standard (12 ug/m^3) and China’s (35 ug/m^3).

The data, of course, show that Beijing’s air quality is atrocious, with annual average PM2.5 many times higher than recommended levels. But what about the trend? Well it’s actually not clear. Obviously the first quarter of 2014 has been terrible, but that could be just the season (see next graph). 2013 was slightly worse than 2012, but that’s not a trend; 2012 may have been abnormally clean. Overall, it looks like Beijing’s air has not gotten demonstrably worse or better over the past six years.

Monthly Averages
From these data we can take a first look at seasonal periodicity in PM2.5. This graph shows monthly average PM2.5 levels over the entire dataset (note: I should really show error bars in this, but don’t have the time to put that together right now and anyway this isn’t peer-reviewed, just a quick look):

This is a strange pattern that I’m not sure how to interpret. It does seem to make intuitive sense that the winter months would be worse, but why also June and July? Perhaps the answer lies in the weather and wind patterns of the spring and fall that help disperse pollution, but that’s just a guess.

Let’s look at the entire time series (monthly averages):

This is way less clean/clear. The extreme variability of the monthly air quality jumps out immediately, especially January 2013 and February 2014 (worst months), as well as January 2011 (best month).

Hourly Averages
Ever wonder how Beijing’s pollution changes over the course of the day? Well, take a look:

I’d say that looks like a pretty clear trend, with PM2.5 surging during evening rush hour and remaining high into the early hours of the morning. Is this linked to motor vehicle patterns (including trucks entering the city at night?) or related to diurnal weather patterns? I’m not sure yet, but certainly worth closer look and investigation.

Categories
Finally, at the risk of showing too much in one table, here’s the percentage binning of days by US AQI category in each of the years (further description of these bins is here).

As also noted by Wayne Ma in WSJ, nearly half of the days are deemed “Unhealthy” by the US EPA. (I haven’t compared these yet against the Chinese scale, as Wayne did.) It’s clear that Beijing and the national government have a lot of work left to do. But really we knew that before we had 50,000 data points to prove it.

Next Steps
I get asked all the time by researchers if I have these data; I’m so glad that State has finally put them out there public. I’ve just scratched the surface here, and I’m really looking forward to seeing the further analysis people come up with. If I have time I’ll post some more analysis this week. Now if only the Chinese National Environmental  Monitoring Center would do a similar data dump…

Happy New Year!

I was asked to contribute a short essay to China Dialogue’s New Year’s “Predictions for China’s environment in 2014.”

They’ve given me permission to re-post here. Originally posted, in English and Chinese, at China Dialogue: https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6609-Predictions-for-China-s-environment-in-2-14/en

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2013 will be remembered in China as the year of the “airpocalypses.” Smoggy skies throughout the year (e.g. Beijing in January, Harbin in October, Shanghai in December) drew unprecedented attention from the media, the general public, and China’s leaders. The Chinese government responded by issuing a surprisingly aggressive series of new plans and regulatory actions. The most important of these, September’s State Council Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan, establishes new binding air quality improvement targets for cities, mandates a host of specific pollution control actions such as fuel quality improvements and regional coal caps, requires cities to adopt emergency pollution response plans, and much more. Some provinces and cities also issued their own, detailed set of additional directives; Beijing famously “declared war” on PM2.5 before releasing its 84-point plan.

If 2013 was the year so many government air quality plans were forged, 2014 is the year they will begin to be wielded. A few examples from the transport sector specifically: starting January 1^st, the nationwide implementation of a cleaner gasoline standard means that all cars will emit less pollution; a parallel cleaner diesel standard will follow by the end of the year. In Beijing, new limits on the population of vehicles will make winning the city’s notorious license plate lottery even more unlikely, while thousands of electric and gas-fuelled buses and municipal trucks will begin to hit the streets. 2015 and beyond will bring even more aggressive goals, especially sweeping new regulations and targets for the greater Beijing, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta regions.

Of course, ultimate success will be evaluated not by how many directives the government issues – or even on how well they are implemented and enforced – but rather on actual, measured improvements in the air people are breathing. China’s recently completed, extensive air quality monitoring network publicly broadcasts hourly, real-time air quality data, data that will be watched closely by the media, public, and government alike. Unfortunately, even with China’s new, comprehensive air quality improvement plans, solving the air pollution crisis will likely take many years. Whether China’s public has the patience to endure a few more years of poor air quality (and inevitable, occasional airpocalypses) while the lengthy clean-up unfolds may be just as interesting to watch in 2014 as the plans and policies themselves.

Over the past few months, there have been a few suggestions from Chinese researchers and officials that Beijing’s government should go after cooking, especially outdoor barbecues, as a way of controlling air pollution. Back in May, I was quoted in the WSJ’s China Realtime Report questioning this strategy, noting my opinion that because barbecue emissions are very minor compared with emissions from motor vehicles, power plants, and industrial sources, I think it’s misguided and unfair to target the wonderful Beijing institution of outdoor chuanr. (At a deeper level, I am also concerned about the idea that average people (laobaixing) should be blamed for pollution or should have to “share the burden” to make the skies blue. The primary burden of action for the next decade falls primarily on government and industry.)

In any case, last week, cooking-as-a-pollution-source was back in the news, with another official highlighting the need for Beijingers to contribute to the air quality improvement efforts by, apparently, modifying their cooking practices. (There is even a debate going on about the differing PM2.5 impacts of different regional cuisines.) As noted in a nice summary in the SCMP, the official was widely ridiculed and refuted by both the Beijing EPB and academic researchers.

But before we dismiss this story as a case of a ridiculous official trying to do anything to blame Beijing’s pollution on something other than poor environmental regulation of obvious major sources, let’s take a closer look at whether there is any merit to the claim.

First of all, how much does cooking really matter? The closest I’ve seen to an “official” source apportionment for Beijing’s PM2.5 pollution are numbers cited by Vice Mayor Hong Feng in a January 2013 interview. Cooking isn’t even included, leading me to believe that the Beijing EPB doesn’t see it as a primary culprit:

对于PM2.5的构成，北京市副市长洪峰在北京两会期间表示，大概22%以上是机动车排放的；近17%是燃烧煤炭如电厂、锅炉、散煤排放；16%是扬尘排放，1.5亿多平方米的工地；还有16%的工业喷涂挥发如汽车喷漆、家具喷漆；4.5%是农村养殖、秸秆焚烧；还有24.5%不是北京产生的污染。

Here are those data in a pie chart:

The above data, like most citywide inventories I’ve seen, don’t include cooking. But is cooking generally omitted because it truly is insignificant, or simply because most researchers – wrongly – don’t even think about it? At least one researcher would argue the latter. Wang Yuesi, an atmospheric physics researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has claimed that cooking is responsible for 13% of Beijing’s PM2.5. A detailed breakdown of his numbers were presented at a Clean Air Asia conference earlier this year. Cooking here is shown in red (other sources are in comparable color to the above chart):

Wang Yuesi data on Beijing PM2.5 sources (left: Beijing; right: greater Beijing region)

I don’t know how many other researchers out there would validate this 13% number. Still, this is at least one data point to suggest that cooking is not entirely insignificant and (perhaps) should not be laughed off as quickly and easily as I did earlier this year.

Regardless of the exact contribution of cooking to Beijing’s overall pollution problem, this debate raises an important point that is sometimes forgotten in air quality discussion. When it comes to quality of life and health impacts, what matters is not citywide averages but what people are actually exposed to on a day-to-day basis. (In my work, I often argue that the 22% number thrown around for fraction of PM2.5 from motor vehicles is far smaller than the reality of exposure, since 3/4ths of Beijing’s population lives near a roadway.) Along these lines, my friend Rob Earley took issue with my WSJ comments and e-mailed me the following perspective:

While probably not a big contributor to ambient air pollution across the entire Beijing “airshed”, open-air charcoal fired BBQ is certainly a contributor to local pollution that can directly affect hundreds to thousands of people in areas of high BBQ intensity and high population intensity. As you know, I live directly upstairs from Gui Jie where there is no shortage of BBQing going on at night, and when the wind blows in the right direction, my clothes hanging in the balcony to dry will most definitely take on a smoky, lamby odour. My air purifier agrees that there is something coming through the window to get excited about. While I don’t have the resources to confirm this scientifically, there are research papers that suggest that BBQ smoke does contain significant particulate matter, aromatic compounds and traces of heavy metals. In areas such as gui jie where there are apartment buildings surrounding the BBQ area, there is definitely potential for hundreds of families to be exposed on a daily basis to local high levels of smoke in addition to ambient pollution. I do believe that a major principle of health effects from PM exposure has to do with local conditions – as we’ve discussed before, concentrations of PM are highest within 50 m of major roadways. I expect that PM concentrations would also be very high in areas that supply open-air charcoal BBQ on a regular basis.

In a follow-up, Rob noted that because it’s actually quite challenging to accurately estimate the pollution contributions from different sources in Beijing, people take advantage of the uncertainty to push certain political goals (maybe you have other reasons for wanting to crack down on barbecues) or to dodge responsibility. In the end, the proper solution is probably to go after all the sources you can think of. Although I believe the short and medium-term solutions to improve Beijing’s air quality are to tackle motor vehicles and coal-burning power plants and industrial facilities, that doesn’t mean that effectively controlling these will be sufficient to improve Beijing’s long-term air quality to world-class standards. California, which has notoriously struggled to improve air quality despite stringent emission standards, has regulations affecting a number of unexpected sources like wood-burning, lawnmowers, and, yes, even barbecues.

Cross-posted on the ICCT Staff blog.

A few days ago, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced a new pricing policy for higher quality fuels. The policy calls for the prices of China IV gasoline and diesel (50ppm sulfur content) to be increased by 290 and 370 RMB/ton, respectively. The prices of China V gasoline and diesel (10ppm) are to be raised a further 170 and 160 RMB/ton, respectively. The new pricing changes are designed to encourage and assist China’s refineries to meet the fuel quality improvement timeline announced by the State Council earlier this year. That timeline calls for nationwide supply of China IV gasoline by the end of 2013, China IV diesel by the end of 2014, and China V gasoline and diesel by the end of 2017.

The pricing changes appear to be the first steps in implementing State Council calls in October 2011 and February 2013 to use progressive fiscal policy to encourage the supply of higher quality fuels. Additional fiscal policies, for example a fuel tax adjustment differentiated by fuel quality, will likely be announced separately by the Ministry of Finance (though the timing of any additional MOF policy announcement is uncertain).

To understand better and contextualize what the NDRC pricing numbers actually mean, let’s look at the answers to some relevant questions:

1) What does it mean for the NDRC to set the price of fuel per ton?
The price of fuel in China is controlled by the NDRC, rather than being market-driven (though China has been slowly revising its pricing policy to better reflect the international price of crude). The NDRC sets the prices, per ton, to be paid to refineries in China for a variety of different petroleum products including gasoline and diesel used in motor vehicles.

2) How is the per-ton price of fuel linked to the per-liter cost to consumers at the pump?
Changes in the per-ton prices set by the NDRC usually directly result in changes in per-liter prices at the pump. For example, in their 9/13 regular fuel price adjustment notice, the NDRC announced the per-ton price change while also directly estimating the impact on prices at the pump. But in that case, the price changes were due to recent changes in the international crude price, a slightly different case.

Regarding the upgrading to China IV and V fuels, the NDRC explicitly stated in a follow-up Q&A that refineries and consumers should both bear a portion of the cost of the higher quality fuel. Although the NDRC has not detailed what those portions should be, the recent announcement implies that the cost burden to be absorbed by the refineries is not included in the announced price changes. This would imply that the primary burden of the additional price will be passed on to consumers. Even so, in their original announcement, the NDRC noted that additional subsidies and fiscal incentives may still be used to ensure that the cost burden of the higher quality fuel is not too great, especially for poorer consumers. Therefore, it’s unclear now what the final per-liter pump price increases will be.

3) What is the current price of fuel in China?
The price of fuel varies by region in China. The current, per-ton prices for gasoline and diesel in China are around 9500-9700 and 8700-8900 RMB/ton, respectively. (Note: the prices are higher in cities like Beijing and Shanghai which have already upgraded their fuel quality.)

A ton of gasoline yields about 1379 liters. A ton of diesel, which is denser, yields about 1190 liters. Assuming average nationwide per-ton prices of 9600 RMB for gasoline and 8800 RMB for diesel, we can roughly estimate per-liter prices of about 6.96 RMB/liter for gasoline and 7.4 RMB/liter for diesel ($4.35/gallon for gasoline and $4.62/gallon for diesel). (Note: the the WSJ reported Tuesday slightly lower nationwide weighted average pump prices of $4.21/gallon (gasoline) and $4.36/gallon (diesel).)

4) If the increased price per ton is passed entirely to consumers, what will the impact be on prices at the pump?
The total NDRC price increases for upgrading from China III to V gasoline and diesel are 460 and 530 RMB/ton, respectively. This is equivalent to 0.33 RMB/liter (0.21 USD/gallon) for gasoline and 0.45 RMB/liter (0.28 USD/gallon) for diesel. If these price increases are entirely passed to consumers, they will result in cost increases of about 4.8% for gasoline and 6.0% for diesel.

5) How did the NDRC determine the price increases?
In the Q&A posted on their website, the NDRC explained that the price increases were based on comprehensive investigations and audits of Sinopec and PetroChina refineries which have already been upgraded to be able to produce China IV and V fuel, as well as experience from Beijing and Shanghai. (Beijing has already implemented China V fuel, while Shanghai is currently transitioning to China V.) The NDRC’s nationwide price adjustments for the China III->V transition are identical to the price adjustments used in Beijing and Shanghai for upgrading from China II to China V.

6) Are the price changes enough to cover the increased cost of refining higher quality fuel?
A 2012 ICCT study suggested that the additional cost to produce China V (10ppm) fuels in China would be just 0.04 and 0.11 RMB/liter for gasoline and diesel, significantly less than the NDRC’s announced price increases. This implies that the announced price adjustments should be way more than adequate to cover the required refinery upgrades and increased production costs for China V fuel. Even before additional fiscal policy measures from MOF are implemented, this pricing certainty will be instrumental in incentivizing China’s refineries to move ahead with the upgrades in order to meet the fuel quality timeline.

7) What about compliance and enforcement?
Finally, it’s important to note that the NDRC announcement included an entire paragraph on the importance of and mechanisms for ensuring compliance and enforcement of the fuel quality. In addition to asking multiple ministries (MEP, MOFCOM, SAIC, AQSIQ, NEA, and others) to work closely together, the NDRC even calls on the media and public to play a role in supervising improvement efforts and calling out illegal activity. Combined with the price increases, this further underscores the Chinese government’s deep commitment to ensuring the fuel quality timeline is met and commensurate air quality improvements are achieved.

China’s State Council today released a massive new air pollution control plan, the latest in a string of Chinese government actions (and promises of future actions) following January’s “airpocalypse.” This is certainly the highest profile and most wide-reaching plan we’ve seen so far, underscoring the attention being paid at the highest levels of government to improving air quality throughout the country.

I tweeted my thoughts tonight as I read the plan, but before I go to bed I’ll summarize a few highlights here.

First let me say that I have little expertise on topics beyond motor vehicles and ambient air quality monitoring. Some of the initial reporting (Reuters, WSJ) has focused on the plan’s announcements related to power generation, coal consumption, industrial emissions, etc. I’m not commenting on those here not because they aren’t important, but just because that’s not what I work on.

That having been said, here’s what really impresses me about the plan:

- Major focus on regional coordination to improve air quality across broad air basins as opposed to working city-by-city. The three big regions mentioned repeatedly in the plan are the greater Beijing region (including Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei), the Yangtze River Delta region (including Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu), and the Pearl River Delta region in Guangdong. This is great news because, as I have noted, air pollution is absolutely a regional problem that requires regional solutions. Nice to see this being acknowledged by the State Council in such a foundational way.

- The plan establishes a system of binding ambient air quality improvement targets. I have previously written about how this is important for closing the loop between emissions and the air people are actually breathing, as well as for keeping officials accountable for environmental improvements that are tied to human health benefits. The specific targets in the plan are 10% reductions in PM10 concentrations for most cities, and 25%/20%/15% PM2.5 reduction goals for the greater BJ/YRD/PRD regions. The goals are all 2017 goals vs. 2012 baseline. There are some nice comments in the plan about the investigation and disciplining of officials who fail to meet the goals (though no specifics on penalties).

- Specific to motor vehicles, the plan reinforces the existing national fuel quality improvement timelines, but also establishes a new goal that China 5 gasoline and diesel (10ppm sulfur content) must be supplied to the three key regions by the end of 2015.

- The plan proposes massive scrappage goals for older, high polluting vehicles. China has hinted several times at goals to scrap all yellow-label vehicles (defined as Euro 0 gasoline and Euro 0, I, II diesel vehicles), but I’ve never seen such a clear goal codified before. The plan states that all YLVs nationwide should be scrapped by 2017. For the record, China had like 15 million yellow-label vehicles in 2011. That’s a huge number of vehicles to scrap. The plan also calls for “basically” scrapping all YLVs in the three key regions (5 million vehicles) by 2015, and scrapping all pre-2005 operational YLVs nationwide by 2015.

That’s the good news. Unfortunately, I wasn’t uniformly delighted by the plan. I am less than impressed by the following:

- I’m not sure why the plan sets PM10 reduction targets (as opposed to PM2.5) for some cities. PM2.5 is harder to control, but also more dangerous than PM2.5. China has new PM2.5 air quality standards and is completing a nationwide PM2.5 ambient air quality monitoring network, so why not jump straight to evaluation metrics based on PM2.5?

- I’m deeply disappointed that the plan doesn’t call for any new vehicle emission standards. In this respect, the plan is much weaker than the plan Beijing released less than two weeks ago. Fuel quality improvements are critical because they enable more stringent standards to take effect. Scrappage programs are great, but they are most effective when the replacement vehicles are as clean as possible. Why would the State Council release such a comprehensive plan that doesn’t include any mention of upgrading vehicle emission standards? It is a strange and glaring omission to me.

Final note: here’s what I wish it said about vehicle emission standards: “taking advantage of the upgraded fuel supplies, China VI vehicle emission standards will be implemented in the three key regions in 2015, and nationwide in 2018.”

Earlier this week, Beijing’s government “declared war” (宣战) on PM2.5, releasing its most aggressive, detailed plan to date to reduce emissions and improve air quality. The overall goal of the plan is to reduce Beijing’s PM2.5 concentration about 25% from 2012 levels by 2017. The targets vary by district, but the overall average for the city – and the target for the most densely populated areas – is 60 ug/m3. Achieving this target would represent dramatic progress for the city, though even at 60 ug/m3 Beijing’s air quality would still be nearly double China’s ambient air quality annual standard (35 ug/m3).

Still, the plan is impressive in its breadth, specificity, and detailed assignment of responsibility. For each of the 84 separate measures described, the leading agencies – and even name of the person(s) on the hook – are mentioned.

Several of the key features of the plan have already been summarized by the media (e.g. Reuters, Xinhua, CRI). But I thought it would be worthwhile to translate and take a closer look at some of the specific actions related to motor vehicle emission control (Section 3 of the plan). The 22 measures described (#21-42) represent a truly comprehensive and world class approach to controlling air pollution from cars, buses, and trucks in the city. Beijing already has mainland China’s highest fuel quality (10 ppm S) and most stringent tailpipe emission standards (China V). Completing the following plan would cement Beijing’s position not just as a leader within China but as one of the world’s leading cities in terms of motor vehicle emission control.

Selected vehicle emission control measures from Beijing’s 2013-2017 Clean Air Action Plan:

#21: Control total vehicle population in the city to less than 6 million by the end of 2017. Given that the population of vehicles in Beijing already well exceeds 5 million, this will almost certainly mean reducing the current monthly new vehicle quota of 20,000.

#22: Reduce fuel consumption in the city by >5% in 2017 as compared to 2012, primarily through the promotion of new energy vehicles, small vehicles, and reducing overall vehicle use.

#23: Increase the cost of vehicle use through various measures, including progressive parking pricing and a congestion charge (though it should be noted that that the plan only commits to researching this, not to implementing it).

#24: Restrict vehicle use by time and location, including more strict controls on vehicles registered outside Beijing. Beijing already has such restrictions, but they will be expanded. For example, beginning in 2014, only China III and higher certified vehicles will be eligible to receive permits to regularly enter the 6th ring road. After 2015, only China IV and higher light-duty vehicles will be eligible for permits to enter the city, and yellow-label trucks (China II and older) will be banned altogether.

#26: Upgrade vehicle emission standards for on-road vehicles and off-road engines.

• By the end of 2014, all new heavy-duty diesel vehicles should meet the China V standard, while all new heavy-duty diesel vehicles used in the city center should be equipped with DPFs. In addition, 100 public buses should meet the China VI standard (pilot), and Beijing EPB should begin research on the “Beijing 6″ standards for LDVs.
• Beginning in 2015, all off-road equipment must meet the Tier 4 standard or better.
• By 2015, Beijing EPB will complete an ORVR standard and implementation plan for gasoline vehicles.
• Strive to implement the China VI standards in 2016.

#27: Improve fuel quality by establishing a China 6 standard for local fuel quality and strive to implement it in 2016. Beijing has the potential to surpass Europe (currently at Euro 5) in this regard.

#28: Scrap one million older vehicles, including all yellow-label vehicles by 2015. Beginning 2014, preferentially support the replacement of vehicles with hybrid and energy-saving vehicles with displacement <1.6 L. This would presumably be an extension/expansion of Beijing’s existing scrappage programs, which are already China’s most successful. (Latest stats: Beijing scrapped nearly 150,000 vehicles in the first half of 2013.)

#29-37: Incredibly specific targets for introducing clean and alternative fuel vehicles (electric, hybrid, natural gas, etc.) in the public bus, taxi, long-distance bus, municipal service vehicles, freight, and low-speed vehicle fleets.

#38: Strive to have 200,000 new energy and clean energy vehicles in the city by the end of 2017.

#41: Strengthen in-use vehicle supervision and fuel quality compliance, including greatly expanding the number of random emissions inspections, building a full remote sensing network with 150 sets of equipment by 2016, and increasing the number of fuel quality checks including vapor recovery system evaluations.

#42: Set energy reduction standards for the transportation sector, including fuel consumption standards for freight vehicles. This will be interesting as it’s unclear what authority Beijing has to set or enforce such standards.

It’s really quite an impressive list. In many cases, there is significant additional detail beyond what I’ve described above, plus there are additional measures on public transit that I didn’t include here.

So, will it work? We’ll see. In any case, at this point it’s hard to imagine anything else Beijing could be doing beyond what’s in this plan to control emissions within its borders. Unfortunately, much of Beijing’s pollution is regional in nature, drifting in from the surrounding provinces. Hopefully, Beijing’s aggressive action demonstrated in this plan will spurn equivalent aggressive, comprehensive action at the regional and national levels.