1997 Congressional HearingsSpecial Weapons
Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile
1997 Congressional Hearings
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM MR. ROBERT EINHORN SUBMITTED BY SENATOR
COCHRAN
NORTH KOREAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
OCTOBER 21 1997
Question 1. How many and what types of Scud missiles does North
Korea possess?
Answer. North Korea produces two variants of the SCUD
missile, the Scud B, with a maximum range of 300 kilometers,
and Scud C, with a maximum range of 500 kilometers.
The DPRK has a production capacity of four to eight Scuds
monthly, both for export and for its own armed forces, and has
hundreds of Scuds in its current arsenal.
Question 2. Does North Korea have Scuds armed with chemical or
biological weapons? If so, in what numbers?
Answer. North Korea has the ability to produce large
quantities of chemical agents. Since 1990, the DPRK has
expanded and intensified its chemical warfare effort. The DPRK
is believed to have a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons.
North Korea has pursued research and development related to
biological warfare for the past 30 years. Its resources,
including a biotechnical infrastructure, are sufficient to
support production of limited quantities of infectious
biological warfare agents, toxins, and possibly crude
biological weapons.
North Korea could use a variety of means to deliver chemical
or biological agents, including domestically produced
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs,
and ballistic missiles.
Question 3. What is the current status of the No Dong? Has it been
deployed? If so, in what quantities?
Answer. North Korea has developed the No Dong medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM), based on Scud technology, for its own
use, as well as for export.
Flight tested in May 1993, the No Dong has a range between
1,000 and 1,300 km, and will be able to strike nearly all of
Japan when it is deployed. It can be outfitted with
conventional or chemical warheads.
Currently, the reliability and accuracy of the No Dong are in
question, due to its severely limited flight test program.
Question 4. What is the current status of the Taepo-Dong program?
Answer. North Korea continues to devote resources to the
development of longer range missiles, known as the Taepo Dong 1
and 2. The Taepo Dong 1 is assessed to have a range capable of
striking targets in Japan and China, while the Taepo Dong 2
could possibly reach as far as Alaska.
Both missiles are in the early stages of development. Both
systems appear to represent a logical evolution of the
experience gained through work on the Scud and No Dong systems.
Both are two-stage systems and are likely to employ separating
warheads.
North Korea has little experience flight testing its missiles
and has no experience testing multistage ballistic missiles or
other related technologies. This lack of test experience could
complicate North Korea's ability to evaluate, improve, or
repair flaws in its missile designs.
Preparations for a missile test-launch in October 1996 raised
international concern over the development of North Korean
ballistic missiles. The test--associated with either the No
Dong or possibly the initial flight test of a multi-stage
missile--was apparently cancel led because of international
pressure or technical problems. Taepo Dong 1 flight testing
could begin at any time.
Question 5. To what countries has North Korea sold Scuds? In what
quantities? How important to the North Korean economy is the foreign
exchange earned from these transactions?
Answer. See next response.
Question 6. To what countries has North Korea provided missile
production capabilities or assistance and to what extent?
Answer. Despite economic and political problems, Pyongyang
continues to attach a high priority to the development and sale
of ballistic missiles, equipment and related technology.
The DPRK uses sales of missile equipment and technologies to
generate hard currency revenues for its depressed economy and
as a means of supporting continued research and development for
its missile programs.
In the past 10 years, North Korea has received more than one
billion dollars worth of bartered goods and services and hard
currency for SCUD missiles and production technology.
North Korea has provided material and know-how for domestic
Scud missile production programs, including in Libya, Syria and
Iran.
Question 7. Has there been any cooperation between North Korea and
foreign countries regarding chemical or biological weapons?
Answer. Although North Korea is an active supplier of
missiles and related production technology, it has not yet
become a supplier of nuclear, chemical or biological warfare-
related technology.
Question 8. What is the relationship between the No-Dong and Shahab
3 and 4 missiles? Is there evidence that the No Dong is being exported
to Iran or that North Korea is assisting Iran with its Shahab 3 and 4
programs?
Answer. Iran has made significant progress in the last few
years toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in ballistic
missile production. This has been accomplished with
considerable equipment and technical help from North Korea.
Iran can be expected to continue its efforts to acquire
equipment and technologies from North Korea, as well as China
and Russia.
Further details on these missile programs cannot be provided
in an unclassified paper.
Question 9. Is North Korea assisting any other countries with a No
Dong like capability?
We are not able to respond to this question at the
unclassified level.
Question 10. It is evident that North Korea has exported virtually
every missile it has produced, from the Scud B on up to the No Dong. Is
there any reason to believe it would not also export the longer-range
Taepo Dong missiles now under development?
Answer. We are not in a position to speculate upon North
Korea's future behavior.
Question 11. To what extent has North Korea received foreign
assistance for its missile development programs? Has there been
cooperation with China, the Soviet Union or Russia, Egypt or Iran?
Answer. This question was answered in detail in the
classified House Conference Report 104-863, the semi-annual
report to Congress, pursuant to Section 585 (d) of the Omnibus
Appropriations for 199.
Question 12. According to press reports, there have been two rounds
of missile talks with the North Koreans, with the latest round
cancelled by them in August of this year after one of their diplomats
defected. Please describe the goals and status for the missile talks
and what has been accomplished to date.
Answer. We have been working for years to impede the DPRK's
indigenous deployments and missile-related exports through
export controls, sanctions, seizures of equipment shipments,
and political pressure.
The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework provided an opportunity
to augment these measures with direct U.S.-DPRK missile talks.
In 1996 we initiated a bilateral missile dialogue with the DPRK
aimed at bringing an end to DPRK missile exports and slowing
indigenous missile development.
The first round of talks in Berlin, in April 1996, provided a
good beginning. The second round took place in New York in June
1997. Despite the long hiatus, these talks were also
productive. We had serious and business-like discussions, and
the North Koreans appeared willing to engage in a constructive
dialogue on the issues. No agreements were expected at this
stage, and none were reached. This will be an incremental
process. We believe North Korea may be prepared to restrain its
missile exports, but we must keep pressing the DPRK to limit
its indigenous missile deployments and its chemical weapons.
The DPRK agreed to a third round of missile talks in August,
but cancelled it when North Korea's Ambassador to Egypt
defected to the U.S. We continue to press for another round.
Question 13. News reports in June of 1996 stated that, according to
Winston Lord, the United States had offered to lift economic sanctions
on North Korea if it agreed to halt its missile export program. Is this
the essence of the U.S. approach to the problem of North Korean
proliferation? What do you believe is the likelihood of success of such
an approach?
Answer. We cannot discuss the details of our negotiations
with the North Koreans at the unclassified level.
It is too early to speculate on the outcome of these talks.
This will be an incremental process.
Question 14. It is apparent that North Korea's missile program is
extensive, serves important military and political purposes, and
provides a crucial source of income for North Korea. How then does the
United States convince North Korea to give this program up?
Answer. We cannot speculate about future North Korean
behavior, and it is too early to speculate on the outcome of
U.S.-DRPK Missile Talks.
Question 15. In a proliferation report, the Monterey Institute
stated that the Missile Technology Control Regime was ``inadequate to
the task'' of curtailing North Korean missile activities. Do you agree
with this assessment?
Answer. The MTCR has been effective in impeding the flow of
missile-related equipment and technology, and in complicating
and limiting the technological capability of missile programs
of proliferation concern.
Our MTCR Partners--especially our EU Partners--have
implemented much stricter export controls (including on items
not listed on the MTCR Annex) and improved information sharing
on activities of potential proliferation concern.
In addition, the MTCR Partners continue to encourage supplier
states, such as China and North Korea, to restrict their
missile-related exports. They also encourage countries in
regions of tension to exercise restraint in the development and
deployment of MTCR class missiles.
Question 16. North Korea has reportedly stated its willingness to
abide by the MTCR. How much credibility do you give such statements? Do
you believe North Korean membership in MTCR is advisable, and under
what conditions?
Answer. We are not aware that the DRPK currently is
interested in abiding by the MTCR. Until the DPRK conforms to
international nonproliferation norms, there is no point in
speculating about the advisability of its MTCR membership.