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Event Notification Report for June 6, 2011
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/03/2011 - 06/06/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| 46908 |
46910 |
46917 |
46918 |
46919 |
46923 |
46924 |
46925 |
46926 |
46927 |
46928 |
46929 |
| 46930 |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46908 |
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: JANX INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: LINDEN State: NJ
County:
License #: NJ PI 507152
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
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Notification Date: 06/01/2011
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2011
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE RETRIEVAL GUIDE TUBE
The following information was received by fax:
"Radiographers set up a shot on a 2 inch diameter pipe which was laying in jackstands. They were working with a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 42 Ci Iridium-192 sealed source. The jobsite was a large laydown yard in an industrial setting. The pipe fell from the stands and hit the guide tube. The guide tube was hit about 2 inches from the exposure end, and attempts at retracting the source were unsuccessful. The radiographers re-established boundaries and contacted the local [Assistant] RSO (ARSO) from the new boundary at approximately 1200 [EDT]. The ARSO is authorized to perform source retrieval for JANX. [The licensee] maintained surveillance while awaiting his arrival. The ARSO arrived onsite at 1240 [EDT], assessed the situation and interviewed the crew. He noted that the source tube appeared to have 2 crimps. The ARSO was in contact with the Corporate RSO in Michigan during the operation.
"The ARSO used lead blankets to shield the source and surveyed. Survey revealed need for more shielding that was delivered to the site by [1345 EDT] and acceptable dose rate was achieved. He proceeded to remove the crimped section from the guide tube, observed that the drive cable was unaffected, connected the tube together with tape, and was able to retract the source into the exposure device. The event concluded by [1520 EDT]. The licensee will be making a full report with corrective actions within 30 days of the occurrence."
New Jersey Event: NJ 11003 |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46910 |
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FRANK JIRAN CONTRACTOR, INC
Region: 3
City: LODI State: WI
County: COLUMBIA
License #: 021-1255-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
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Notification Date: 06/01/2011
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PORTABLE NUCLEAR GAUGE STOLEN AND THEN RECOVERED
The following information was received by fax:
"On May 31, 2011 the Department [Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section] received notification via email from the licensee's RSO that the licensee had reported a portable nuclear gauge stolen from their storage location in Lodi, WI (Columbia County). The Department called the licensee for additional information on June 1, 2011. The gauge was a Seaman model R-50 roofing gauge containing a maximum of 40 mCi of Americium-241:Be. In the call the licensee stated that on May 1, 2011 they had discovered their storage location had been broken into, their security barriers to the gauge had been defeated, and their portable nuclear gauge had been removed from the premises. Law enforcement had been notified on May 1, 2011 and investigated the theft. The gauge was recovered on May 28, 2011 in Madison, WI and had already been returned to the licensee at the time this conversation took place. The Department performed a reactive inspection on June 1, 2011, and confirmed that the gauge was recovered in good condition and placed in secure storage. The Department is waiting for additional information regarding this theft from both the Madison Police Department and the Columbia County Sheriff's Office." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46917 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CRAIG JONES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 05:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2011
Event Time: 00:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
UNEXPECTED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ACTUATION
"On 6/3/2011 at 0039 hours, during the performance of a work order to test components associated with Service Water Isolation, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' unexpectedly started automatically and its supply breaker to Safeguards Bus 14 closed. The Control Room staff observed normal voltage on Diesel Generator A. Bus 14 voltage was never lost during this event, however, they also noted an associated Bus 14 undervoltage annunciator on the Main Control Board. Seconds later, Emergency Diesel Generator A tripped on Reverse Power and its supply breaker to Bus 14 tripped open. The initiating action was the removal of the Bus 14 Normal Feed Breaker Control Power Fuses as part of the work order package.
"The Ginna EDG's have the following automatic start signals and logic: manual, safety injection signal (1/2 trains), undervoltage on respective safeguards bus, A EDG Bus 14 or 18 (1 out of 2 degraded voltage + 1 out of 2 loss of voltage), B EDG Bus 16 or 17 (1 out of 2 degraded voltage + 1 out of 2 loss of voltage).
"Investigation has commenced to determine the cause of the EDG start and undervoltage signal.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46918 |
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHERIE SONODA
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
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Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2011
Event Time: 13:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
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Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's access to the site has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46919 |
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRANDON SHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 12:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2011
Event Time: 10:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC SCRAM FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP
"Limerick Unit 1 automatically scrammed from 100% power at 1021 EDT hrs on 6/3/11. The RPS actuation occurred as designed upon an automatic trip of the Main Turbine. The cause of the Main Turbine trip is under investigation. Plant response to the Main Turbine trip was per design without complications.
"All control rods fully inserted. No ECCS or RCIC initiations occurred. No Primary or Secondary Containment isolations occurred.
"The plant is currently in Hot Shutdown with the normal Feedwater system maintaining reactor water level, and the Main Turbine Bypass valves maintaining reactor pressure.
"Limerick Unit 2 was unaffected."
The post-scram electrical alignment is normal.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify appropriate state and local authorities. The licensee is also planning a press release. |
| Part 21 |
Event Number: 46923 |
Rep Org: VELAN INC
Licensee: VELAN INC
Region:
City: QUEBEC State:
County: CANADA
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR APOSTOLESCU
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
JOSELITO CALLE (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PT 21 GRP VIA E-MAIL ()
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Event Text
POTENTIAL DEFECT IN CERTAIN VELAN SUPPLIED GLOBE VALVES
The following is a summary of a Part 21 e-mail notification received from Velan Inc:
Velan Inc., a valve vendor, has identified a potential defect in certain lots of 0.5, 0.75 and 1 inch NPS globe valves sold to Areva and Fenoc. The failure could result in the valve travelling into the bonnet cavity and became jammed between body and bonnet. The analysis revealed that the failure was caused by the wrong bonnet being installed on the valve which ultimately allowed the disc to travel too far into the bonnet cavity and consequently the disc dropped into the body-bonnet gap. This prevented the valve from being closed during manual operation.
Internal analysis also determined that this failure mode is very plausible in valves installed with the stem in a horizontal orientation. Valves installed with the stem in vertical orientation are far less likely to fail but we cannot guarantee that; on valves that are normally fully open certain flow conditions may cause the disc to tilt and jam between body and bonnet. Nevertheless, operational history seems to suggest that valves installed with the stem in vertical orientation have not experienced this type of failure.
Velan has requested that each affected utility reviews the individual applications for the specific valves identified in this notification; in the event of any application where the valves inability to close will impact significantly the safe operation of the plant. Velan will work with the utility towards reaching a suitable solution.
Velan does not have specific information concerning the specific system and function applicable to these globe valves and therefore we cannot assess whether a substantial safety hazard exists as a result of their inability to close after falling as described above.
Velan's investigation and review of the available manufacturing records revealed that the same bonnet, with an oversized lift, was installed in all valves identified hereunder.
CUSTOMER ORDER QTY. VALVE FIGURE No. VALVE SERIAL No.
AREVA NP 8 W04-2074B-02AA 971022-1 to-8
AREVA NP 12 W03-2074B-02AA 971042-1 to -12
AREVA NP 27 W04-2074B-02AA 971048-1 to -27
AREVA NP 5 W03-2074B-02AA 981028-1 to-5
AREVA NP 5 W03-20748-02AA 981030-1 to-5
AREVA NP 10 W05-20748-02AA 001012-1 to-10
AREVA NP 13 W03-20748-02AA 001029 -1 to -13
AREVA NP 26 W04 20748-02AA 001056 -1 to -26
ARE VA NP 10 W04-20748-02AA 011035-1 to-10
FENOC 4 W05-2074B 02AA 001033 -1 to-4 |
| Part 21 |
Event Number: 46924 |
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE LIMITORQUE ACTUATORS
Licensee: FLOWSERVE LIMITORQUE ACTUATORS
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF McCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
JOSELITO CALLE (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PT 21 GRP VIA E-MAIL ()
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Event Text
POSSIBLE DEFICIENCY IN ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING OF LIMITORQUE GEARED LIMIT SWITCH FOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT
The following is a summary of a Part 21 fax notification received from Flowserve-Limitorque Actuators:
This Part 21 evaluation is for Geared Limit Switch - Nylon Bearing Retainer Cage. Flowserve has provided the NRC an interim report that provides information concerning an evaluation that is being performed by Flowserve - Limitorque regarding a possible deficiency in previous EQ test programs which qualified Limitorque SMB-000 & 00 actuators to IEEE-382 requirements for inside containment service. An investigation to date has revealed that the non-metallic retainer cage material of the radial ball bearing may not have been properly considered when determining thermal aging requirements during EQ testing.
The safety related component affected is the geared limit switch (GLS) assembly on actuator type / size Limitorque SMB/SB/SBD-000 and SMB/SB/SBD-00 only qualified for inside containment to Limitorque EQ report number B0058 and B0212. The sub-component of the GLS under evaluation is a radial ball bearing (manufacturer's part # 1604-DC and 7304-DC) manufactured by Nice / RBC Bearing Corp / SKF which has been used in the cartridge assembly. This bearing provides partial support to the input pinion shaft of the GLS. This bearing was manufactured with a nylon (polyamide 6/6) retainer cage.
a) This bearing is used on the 2-train and 4-train geared limit switch cartridge assembly of the SMB/SB/SBD-00 and the 4-train GLS cartridge of the SMB/SB/SBD-000 only.
b) The GLS assembly used in SMB/SB/SBD-0, 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 actuators use a slightly different cartridge construction that does not contain this bearing.
The functionality of the cartridge bearing in the GLS assembly may not have been properly validated in an accident environment test with the non-metallic nylon material properly thermally aged to "end of life" condition.
Limitorque is continuing the evaluation of this issue in an effort to finalize this position.
At this point of the evaluation, Limitorque does not feel that the safety related function of the subject actuators will be affected by the existence of the nylon bearing retainer cage in the GLS assembly. Limitorque will continue the evaluation of this issue and will submit a status update on or before July 15, 2011.
To date, the use of the nylon cage bearing in the GLS assembly has shown no negative affects on operability of the switch. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46925 |
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 06/04/2011
Notification Time: 23:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 16:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
BOTH CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS OUT OF SERVICE
"On 06/04/2011, personnel observed the temperature control valve for the 'B' control structure chiller not operating properly. To investigate control valve operation, the controller was taken to the manual mode (from automatic) at 1614 [EDT]. The control valve stem was lubricated, and the valve was operated with the controller in the manual mode. The 'B' control structure chiller was inoperable in this condition until control valve responsiveness was validated (total of 35 minutes, until 1649 [EDT]). The 'B' chiller continued to operate during this period.
"The 'A' control structure chiller was out of service during this timeframe to perform maintenance activities. Hence, neither chiller was operable.
"The control structure chillers provide control building habitability during unit operation. The control structure chillers also provide cooling water for emergency switchgear room cooling on unit one only.
"This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46926 |
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 06/05/2011
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2011
Event Time: 12:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2011
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A SEWAGE SPILL INTO A STORM DRAIN
"On June 5, 2011 at 1202 [EDT] the Hope Creek Shift Manager was notified of a sewage spill at the site sewage treatment plain. Approximately 1000 gallons of intimated sewage entered a nearby storm drain. The onsite Fire Department responded to the scene to contain the spill. Offsite support from a local sanitary waste disposal vendor was requested who responded to the site to assist in the cleanup.
"A 15 minute notification to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was required and completed on June 5, 2011 at 1214 [EDT].
"At 1320 [EDT] the sewage inpu
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