Paul Draper’s Argument from Evil (part 2)
by Luke Muehlhauser on June 1, 2010 in Guest Post,Problem of Evil
Now that looks painful.
Guest blogger John D of Philosophical Disquisitions summarizes contemporary articles in philosophy of religion in plain talk so that you can be up to speed on the God debate as it ensues at the highest levels of thought. Visit John’s blog for more helpful summaries of contemporary philosophical works.
In this series, I am looking at Paul Draper’s article “Pain and Pleasure: An evidential Problem for Theists.” In it, Draper argues that certain observations (O) we have made concerning the biological utility of pain are less likely on the hypothesis of theism (T) than they are on the hypothesis of indifference (HI). Or, in formal terms:
Pr(O|T) < Pr(O|HI)
In part 1, I introduced some of the key concepts upon which Draper relies in making his case. In this part, I will summarise the main chunk of Draper’s argument. If as you read this and you start to think “Wait a minute! What about theistic rationales for the existence of pain?”, I can only chide you for your impatience. Those issues will be addressed in part 3.
The Biological Utility of Pain
If one lives an insulated, urbanised, sanitized and anesthetized lifestyle – which I personally do – one can often be oblivious to the rather grim cruelty in the natural world. But hearing a pig squeal as its throat is slit – which I once did – can be quite a wake-up-call.
I mention this because unlike typical arguments from the existence of pain (or evil) to atheism, Draper’s argument predicates itself specifically on a problem arising from the biological utility of pain. That is, pain of the type experienced by the pig as its throat is slit.
To make sense of this, Draper needs to explain what he means by biological utility. This begins with a formal definition of what a goal-directed biological system is. Paraphrasing slightly,
A system (S) is goal-directed, just in case for some property or characteristic (G) that S exhibits, environmental changes are such that (i) if no compensating changes occurred in S then S would no longer G; and (ii) if compensating changes occurred in S, then S would continue to G or would repeat G.
Classic behaviorist experiments illustrate what this means. Imagine a rat in a box with a lever in front of it. If the rat presses the lever, he will receive a food reward. So the rat receives compensating changes for exhibiting lever-pressing behavior and is likely to do so. The rat is thus a goal-directed system.
The next important definition is that of “biological goals.” According to Draper, “biological goals” are the environmental changes that induce goal-directed behaviours. So in the case of the rat, receiving food rewards must be one of its biological goals.
Finally then, we reach the definition of “biological utility.” This refers to subcomponents of a biological system (Xs) which are deemed biologically useful if (i) they causally contribute to a biological goal and (ii) their contribution is not accidental.
So, sticking with the rat-in-a-box example, the rat’s eyesight might be deemed biologically useful because it allows him to see the lever and coordinate his actions so as to press the lever and receive the food reward.
Now the key to understanding Draper’s argument is that pain and pleasure are biologically useful. That is to say, pleasure helps to attract us to biologically useful things and pain detracts us from biologically damaging things. That this is true is illustrated by the disastrous biological consequences for people who cannot feel pain (a condition known as congenital analgesia).
It is also true to say that not all pain (or pleasure) is biologically useful. Sometimes it is biologically gratuitous. For example, the pain felt by the squealing pig was biologically gratuitous because although pain may often help a pig to avoid deadly situations, it did not help on this occasion. Something similar can be said about the pleasure experienced by the heroin addict.
(click for full size to read text)
The Argument Restated
As mentioned at the outset, Draper’s argument is that our observations (O) of biologically useful and gratuitous pain are less probable on T than they are on HI. Before showing that this is the case, Draper needs to restate his argument using some theorems from the probability calculus.
First, he divides O into three separate observations:
O1. Observations of moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful.
O2. Observations of sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful.
O3. Observations of sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that is not known to be biologically useful (and likely to be biologically gratuitous).
This means that the original probabilistic formulation of the argument can be restated as:
Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)
Which can in turn (using a theorem from the probability calculus) be restated as:
A: Pr(O1|T) × Pr(O2|T & O1) × Pr(O3|T & O1 & O2)
B: Pr(O1|HI) × Pr(O2|HI & O1) × Pr(O3|T & O1 & O2)
Pr(A) < Pr(B)
The significance of this restatement is that as we consider the likelihood of O1, O2 and O3 given the respective hypotheses (T and HI), we will not be considering them in isolation from each other. Instead, we will be considering the likelihood of each observation given the truth of hypothesis and the preceding observation.
Anyway, let us now consider the probability of each multiplicand in the above restatement.
Moral Agents and Pain or “Pr (O1|T) vs Pr (O1|HI)”
Human beings are, we assume, moral agents. This means that they can appreciate themselves as having moral rights and duties, and they can cultivate an awareness of things that are morally valuable. They are also biological systems that experience biologically useful pain and pleasure.
Draper points out that there is something unique about pleasure and pain that is more troubling for T than it is for HI. What he points out is that, according to many moral theories, pain and pleasure have an intrinsic moral value. That is to say, we would only ever be justified in inflicting pain if there was some overwhelming moral reason for doing so.
This implies that God, as a morally perfect being, would need to have some moral reason for allowing moral agents, such as human beings, to experience pain. A biological reason for allowing pain would not be enough.
Of course, the problem is that even if pain is morally justified it is also clearly observed to be biologically useful. This, Draper submits, makes more sense on HI than it does on T. After all, God could have arranged things so that pain was only experienced in cases where it was morally justified and not in cases where it was merely biologically useful.
Point one for HI.
1. Sentient Beings and Useful Pain or “Pr (O2|T & O1) vs. Pr (O2|HI & O1)”
We move on then to consider the second of our observations: sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful. Remember that we consider this observation on the assumption that T and O1 are true.
This presents another conundrum for the theist. For if T and O1 are true, it must have already been established that pain serves some moral function. To turn around and discover that non-moral beings are experiencing biologically useful pain that cannot serve the same moral function is surprising.
Draper admits that this is not a clear-cut case, but it is at least somewhat less surprising on HI than it is on T.
Point two for HI.
1. Sentient Beings and Gratuitous Pain or “Pr (O3|T & O1 & O2) vs. Pr (O3|HI & O1 & O2)”
The final nail in the coffin is the observation that sentient beings, both moral and non-moral, experience pain that is not obviously biologically useful and sometimes gratuitous. This presents two problems for the theist.
First, on theism we have at least some reason to expect sentient beings (particular non-humans) to be happy. To find that many such beings suffer intense and prolonged suffering is disturbing. To override this disturbance we would like to see a connection between intense suffering and moral goods such as virtue and justice. The problem is that we don’t see this connection. After all, non-moral agents (e.g. the squealing pig) do not have access to these moral goods.
Second, on HI we can expect biologically gratuitous suffering to be a byproduct of an indifferent process of biological evolution. This would suggest that all gratuitous pain should ultimately arise from the pathological failure of biological systems to function properly (e.g. pain from terminal cancer). Or from the appropriate response of biological systems in situations where they cannot be biologically useful (e.g. the excruciating pain experienced by someone being burned alive).
The fact that the gratuitous pain we observe does indeed arise from the failure or appropriate response of otherwise useful biological systems is another mark in favour of HI.
(click for full size to read text)
Conclusion
From the above, Draper concludes that the biologically useful, although sometimes gratuitous, nature of pain and pleasure makes more sense on HI than on T.
That’s it for now. In the next part we will consider whether any proposed theodicies can improve the lot of T.
Previous post: “There’s More to Life than Evidence”
Next post: CPBD 043: Tim Mawson – A Fine-Tuned Universe
{ 34 comments… read them below or add one }
Two comments.
First, a minor comment, your use of the “strike” phrasing is confusing. Such phrasing, at least in the US, is usually used as strikes against something (i.e., the batter’s POV, not the pitcher’s).
Also, I have to disagree with Draper’s argument that O1 is more consistent with HI than T. In particular,
This statement and the surrounding discussion seem to imply that biological necessity is not a sufficient justification for pain, but I do not see why that it so. Saying, that pain and pleasure have intrinsic moral value according to many moral systems does not seem sufficient to show that biologically useful pain is fundamentally more problematic under T than HI.
Erika(Quote)
Oops, I had forgotten to update John’s ‘strike’ idiom in this post. Thanks.
lukeprog(Quote)
““That is to say, we would only ever be justified in inflicting pain if there was some overwhelming moral reason for doing so.
This implies that God, as a morally perfect being, would need to have some moral reason for allowing moral agents, such as human beings, to experience pain. A biological reason for allowing pain would not be enough.” ~ JohnD
This bit doesn’t follow – just because God allows pain does not mean that he inflicts it, and so the case hasn’t been made that God would need moral justification to allow pain.
TaiChi(Quote)
I figure the reasoning is that god could have worked out the biology to avoid pain, unless there was some moral necessity to have it as it is.
Zeb(Quote)
I really enjoy John D’s writings, especially those on his blog.
Bill Maher(Quote)
I agree with Zeb, I think that is the reasoning. They way I thought about it was as follows. If God is a perfectly moral being then he could have set it up so that biology and the associated forms of pain are only inflicted on and cause pain to immoral moral agents (pain that has no biological purpose or goal). That would provide a morally justifiable reason for allowing the pain. But what we find is that all people are inflicted with these forms of pain regardless of morality and so it appears to serve neither a biological or moral goal. Due to its rather uniform distribution there is no moral justification for allowing such pain or that we do not know the criteria for justification if there even is or could be any.
Furthermore we find that animals which we assume to not be moral-agents also suffer from the same kinds of gratuitous pain (no biological function e.g the pig example)or moral one as they are amoral. These are at odds with Theism even if we allow for biological evolution.
For one of the success stories of evolution are viruses. Viruses succeed by inflicting pain on other organisms for reproductive gains. Couldn’t God have made it so that viruses spread wellness via symbiotic relationship benefiting both organisms rather then inflicting pain on the host and only benefiting the virus? Or that viruses could only infect immoral agents.
These issues make more sense under the indifference hypothesis
Gimpness(Quote)
A simple question: Is there a named deity or set of deities that these types of conversations are supposed to apply to?
The reason I ask is because;
1. Most people who are interested in advocating a deity in English speaking parts of the world advocate for one based on a Christian deity.
2. The Christian deity, as described in the Christian Bible, is a poor fit at best for the type of deity described by most people who argue for a benevolent deity. This is fine and by itself does not argue against the Christian deity existing. (I take it as a given that the Christian deity is not an omnimax deity — all good+powerful+knowing — because of what the Christian Bible says about it.)
3. From #1 and #2, some other deity or set of deities would be a better fit.
Thus, my question;
4. Is there a named deity or set of deities that these types of conversations are supposed to apply to?
There are other questions and related problems that flow from those, but I think it’s good to deal with the elephant in the room.
Hermes(Quote)
Zeb, Gimpness,
I agree with you both – I’m just pointing out there’s a flaw in the presentation/argument which needs correction. The claim that God would not be justified in inflicting pain without overwhelming moral reason is more intuitive than the claim that God would not be justified in allowing pain without overwhelming moral reason, and so the argument is made to appear stronger than it is.
Hermes,
I responded to your comment on Part 1, in case you’ve missed it.
TaiChi(Quote)
Re: inflicting v. allowing
I just had a quick look over Draper’s article. His presentation says God would need a reason to permit pain. I would say “permit” is pretty much equivalent to “allow”. So my presentation has made the argument look stronger than it was intended to be.
You might change it to “allow” if you get a chance Luke.
Also, there seems to be something wrong with the last two headings. They didn’t come out in bold.
Re: Erika’s point
I think there is a distinction between a justification based on biological necessity and one based on moral necessity. Draper is arguing that the conscious pain experienced by moral agents would need a moral justification (i.e. would need to serve some moral goal or be part of fulfilling some moral duty).
You could overcome this by saying biological needs must overlap with moral needs. And so the biological utility of pain was an unavoidable side effect of pursuing some moral cause.
John D(Quote)
Hermes, it’s the god of the Christian faith, not of the Christian Bible. The faith precedes the Bible, and the Bible should be interpreted in light of the faith, not the other way around.
Zeb(Quote)
I see what you mean Tai Chi. The first part of the analogy refers to humans needing moral justification to inflict pain, while the second part refers to God needing moral justification to allow pain. The argument needs to either say that humans need moral justification to allow pain (that would be a difficult argument which, if successful, would indict almost everyone), or that God’s allowing pain is equivalent to humans’ inflicting pain (perhaps not such a hard argument since God is omnipotent and created the conditions which made pain possible and likely).
Zeb(Quote)
I’ve heard that before, but it doesn’t make much sense. Are you saying that the Christian Bible is irrelevant?
Hermes(Quote)
Zeb, what I mean is once you have “Christian faith” is a telephone book or Jack Chic pamphlet or a novel like War and Peace or a software manual or — say — the sound of a dripping faucet as relevant as the Christian Bible? If not, why not?
Hermes(Quote)
This is a new one on me! How can Christian faith precede the Bible? What other basis is there for the Christian faith?
Jesus loves me! This I know,
For the Bible tells me so…
ildi(Quote)
“What other basis is there for the Christian faith?”
Lots of people believed that Jesus was raised from the dead before the gospels were written and the New Testament was canonized. This is because the Christian faith is based on the event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, not simply the proclamation of that event.
“Are you saying that the Christian Bible is irrelevant?”
Hermes, I’m not sure I understand what the analogy to other texts is supposed to get us, but I think that I would say that the relevance of the God of the Bible and the God of the Christian faith is one of degree – not one of quality. That is to say, one can posit all sorts of degrees of inspiration and accuracy of biblical God-talk. On one end of the spectrum, you can say, look, all statements made of God in the Bible are literalistically true (even ones that talk about his arms and so forth). On the other end, you can posit that the Bible is sheer fiction, made up, without any basis in reality. But you can have all kinds of views somewhere in the middle too. For example, perhaps we’re wrong to interpret literally all of these Old Testament predications of God, or perhaps the Hebrews had misconceptions about the God who revealed himself to them.
So, the relevance of the biblical God to the Christian God is dependent on how we read the Bible: to what degree do we think the Bible has been inspired or non-inspired by God? What is the best model of interpretation?
Chris K(Quote)
The only evidence for anybody believing that Jesus was raised from the dead are the gospels themselves. There is no other basis for this belief.
ildi(Quote)
Chris K, are you in general agreement with part of the comments expressed in The Young Turns video Luke posted a couple days ago? If you are not, how does what you think is accurate differ from what is mentioned in TYT?
I’ll take it as a given that you are not in complete agreement and will offer nuanced comments covering those differences.
Hermes(Quote)
[ Reposting after potential WordPress hiccup. ]
Chris K, are you in general agreement with part of the comments expressed in The Young Turns video Luke posted a couple days ago? If you are not, how does what you think is accurate differ from what is mentioned in TYT?
I’ll take it as a given that you are not in complete agreement and will offer nuanced comments covering those differences.
Hermes(Quote)
ildi,
You mean other than James most of the Pauline epistles…which were written before the gospels…
Chris K(Quote)
…another attempt at posting this without WordPress rejecting it.
Chris K, are you in general agreement with part of the comments expressed in The Young Turks video Luke posted a couple days ago? If you are not, how does what you think is accurate differ from what is mentioned by them?
I’ll take it as a given that you are *not* in complete agreement but that you are in partial agreement and will offer nuanced comments covering the differences that concern you.
Hermes(Quote)
Hey, just wanted to point out a typo in the equations that are given:
I’m assuming the very last probability should be Pr(O3|HI & O1 &am