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Briefing Book on North Korea's Nuclear Moratorium

Milonopoulos, Hecker, and Carlin: North Korea from 30,000 Feet

David Kang: They Think They're Normal

Resources on the North Korean Succession

USKI Report on Missile Negotiations with North Korea

Lugar on Burma/DPRK Relations

FAO/WFP Report on Food Security in North Korea

Lee Sigal:  Huff Post

Obama/Lee Joint Press Conference

Lee Myung-bak Address to Congress

Korean War MIA/POWs

 

 

 

 

 
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North Korea Announces Plans for Satellite Launch

March 16, 2012

North Korea announced today that it plans to send a satellite into orbit next month, timed to celebrate the 100th birthday of Kim Il-sung. KCNA stated that "Kwangmyongsong-3, a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite, will be blasted off southward from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province between April 12 and 16, lifted by carrier rocket Unha-3."

The US State Department was quick to issue a response:

North Korea’s announcement that it plans to conduct a missile launch in direct violation of its international obligations is highly provocative. UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches. We call on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We are consulting closely with our international partners on next steps.

Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the non-proliferation and disarmament program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, explains that
 

Space launches differ from ballistic-missile tests in their purpose and trajectory. Where space launches only need to go up, ballistic missiles must also come down, to securely deliver their payload, and need to survive atmospheric re-entry. The 2011 IISS Strategic Dossier on North Korean Security Challenges describes the differences in detail (p. 155). But because satellite-launch rockets and ballistic missiles share the same bodies, engines, launch sites and other development processes, they are intricately linked. The satellite launch also provides missile-development information regarding propulsion, guidance and operational aspects.

For more information and analysis, click here.

Upcoming Track II Talks with Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho

March 5, 2012

Ri Yong-ho, North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister and chief envoy to the Six-Party Talks, will be attending several Track II meetings in New York this week, where he may meet with US and South Korean officials, according to news reports. His visit comes in the wake of the February 29 US-North Korean announcement that, in addition to pledging a nuclear freeze and US nutritional assistance to North Korea, promised an increase in "people-to-people exchanges." 

Ri is scheduled to attend a forum hosted by Syracuse University's Maxwell School on Wednesday. The Korea Times, citing an anonymous diplomatic source, says that participants or observers at this meeting may include South Korean envoy to the Six-Party Talks Lim Sung-nam; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry; and James Steinberg, former Deputy Secretary of State and Dean of the Maxwell School.

The Syracuse forum will be followed by another Track II meeting sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Yonhap reports that Ri may meet with US Special Envoy for North Korea policy Glyn Davies, and Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Clifford Hart, at this event. However, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated that "we currently have no plans to have U.S. Government meetings" with the Track II delegation, adding that  "it’ll be a good thing if there are positive North-South contacts on the margins of the Maxwell School event." 

North Korea Agrees to Suspend Nuclear Activities at Yongbyon

February 29, 2012

Following the US-DPRK exploratory talks in Beijing this week, North Korea has agreed to implement a moratorium on nuclear tests, missile launches, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including its enrichment program, as announced by both  the State Department and KCNA. North Korea has also agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to return to the country to verify and monitor the moratorium on enrichment and the disablement of its 5-MW reactor and related facilities at Yongbyon. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the September 19, 2005 agreement and the U.S. reaffirmed that "it does not have hostile intent toward the DPRK and is prepared to take steps to improve our bilateral relationship in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality."

The US and North Korea will also meet in the near future to discuss monitoring conditions for 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance, with the prospect of additional assistance based on continued need. The Korea Herald reports that North Korea sought 50,000 tons of corn in addition to the 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance that was first outlined last December. 

For more resources and analysis on this announcement, see NCNK's briefing book.

Philip Yun: Don't Ignore North Korea

February 8, 2012

Philip Yun argues in The Hill that policies oriented toward either regime change in North Korea or a wait-and-see approach are flawed, and that a proactive policy will be necessary to prevent another North Korean nuclear nuclear test. 

Despite our best efforts, we remain woefully in the dark about the internal leadership dynamics of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This is particularly true for Kim Jong Un. Many assessments of the young Kim rely on anecdotes and hearsay. Given this lack of knowledge, it would be folly to try to steer North Korea’s leadership transition, especially as China is firmly in Kim Jong Un’s court. If the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK) or Japan were to intervene, the unintended consequences could be profound, with a misstep erupting into an ugly scenario pitting a Beijing-backed faction against one backed by the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Just as a policy of fostering regime change is not tenable, a seemingly reasonable wait-and-see/status quo approach is also inadequate. It could sow the seeds for yet another nuclear test in 2013, which could lead to engineering advances that allow the totalitarian North to produce smaller (and more) nuclear warheads. And what better way for a determined North Korea to “market” its nuclear know-how for export?

More...

Cathcart: China and the North Korean Succession

January 27, 2012

Adam Cathcart, editor of the blog Sino-NK, has collected and edited a lengthy dossier, "China and the North Korean Succession," containing translations of Chinese materials concerning North Korea:

This dossier, the first in an ongoing series of SinoNK.com digests on relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), draws upon a number of  open source Chinese materials  to  provide a clearer sketch of the Sino-North Korean relationship during the eight days following the announcement of Kim Jong-Il’s death.  

This  dossier represents the tip of the iceberg when it comes to  Chinese interactions with and analysis of North Korea in this  period.  A careful approach to the documents selected, rather than  an attempt at true comprehensiveness, was favored. Several of the  sources featured in  this dossier are being made available for the  first time in English. These include  dispatches from the Chinese  Embassy in Pyongyang,  more accurate translations from state  media stories of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s visits to the DPRK  Embassy in Beijing, and editorials from Huanqiu Shibao [环球时 报/  Global Times] and  important  “think-tank intellectuals” in  China. Also included is a sample of what Kim’s death looked like  from the perspective of  one  rather active corner of the  microblogging site Sina Weibo.  

For more resources on the new leadership in North Korea, see 's After Kim Jong-il briefing book.

Spencer Kim: "A New Model" for Engaging North Korea

January 27, 2012

Spencer Kim, following the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council for Korea, calls for a "new model" for relations between North Korea and the world, one that is “holistic, sequential, sustained and consensual.” He also addresses the importance of creating a stronger base of knowledge on North Korea:

The second element of the “New Model” is the creation of a reliable “epistemic” community on North Korea. It was clear to those of us on the council, that there is no agreement among “experts” on North Korea on even on the most narrow set of facts, and no reliable understanding of the workings of the international community, and the players in Northeast Asia, among North Koreans. In other words, considering the magnitude of the issue, we don’t know much about each other ― but we do have a full panoply of preconceptions and stereotypes constantly played back by both the media and propaganda to the point that reality has been distorted out of all proportion. And we are all, on all sides, unconsciously victims of the distortion. Like the poor souls in Plato’s Cave, we see the shadows and allow our imaginations to conjure up a distorted reality. 

Kurt Campbell on US-Asia Relations and Engagement with North Korea

January 20, 2012

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell spoke at the Stimson Center on Thursday on a number of topics in US-Asian relations, including future engagement with North Korea the possibility of the resumption of the Six-Party Talks (discussion of North Korea begins 28 minutes into the video).  

 


2012 Joint New Year Editorial

January 1, 2012

On January 1, 2012 the DPRK published its Joint New Year's Editorial mourning the loss of Kim Jong Il, announcing that  2012 will be the year when "Kim Jong Il's plan for achieving prosperity will bear a brilliant fruit, and the year of a grand march, when a new century of Kim Il Sung's Korea begins."  The editorial extols Kim Jong Un as "precisely the great Kim Jong Il," and goes on to state that the country "[M]ust vigorously launch an all-out drive to implement our Party's grand strategy for achieving prosperity," with an emphasis on light industry, electricity production, and solving the food problem.  While referencing the importance of the “Songun-based revolutionary leadership” and the KPA, the editorial proclaims that “To strengthen the Party and enhance its leadership role to the maximum is the decisive guarantee for unfolding a new era of prosperity true to the behests of Kim Jong Il,” stating that "'Let us do many more things for the benefit of the people' -this must be the slogan of action and conscience for our officials in supporting the intentions of the great Party." 

In addition to extolling the DPRK's relations with China and Russia, the editorial states that 

The entire nation, under the unfurled banner of anti-war and peace, should smash every move of reckless military provocation, arms buildup and war exercises against the north. Constant vigilance against the danger of military collaboration of the bellicose forces within the country and without should be maintained, and the US aggressor forces, the main obstacle to peace in the Korean peninsula, should be pulled out from south Korea.

To read the full editorial click here.

Briefing Book: Death of Kim Jong-Il

December 20, 2011

has published a new briefing book on the death of Kim Jong-il and the leadership transition in North Korea, featuring statements and video from the North Korean government, messages from international officials and US politicians, and articles and interviews of members. This briefing book will continue to be updated with new information and resources as they become available.

Death of Kim Jong Il

December 18, 2011

Kim Jong-il died on Saturday  reportedly suffering a massive heart attack during a train ride. He was 69 or 70 years old, according to various accounts. The DPRK has announced 12 days of formal mourning through December 29.

The Korea Central News Agency released the following statement:

Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, passed away from a great mental and physical strain at 08:30 December 17, 2011, on train during a field guidance tour.

The WPK Central Committee and Central Military Commission, DPRK National Defence Commission, Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and Cabinet released a notice on Saturday informing the WPK members, servicepersons and all other people of his passing away.

Rangel Resolution on Korean War MIA/POWs Approved by House

December 14, 2011

A resolution calling for the repatriation of POW/MIAs and abductees in North Korea was approved by the House of Representatives yesterday in a voice vote. The resolution calls for the US government to continue remains recovery operations for the estimated 5,500 American soldiers buried in North Korea, and for the repatriation of the 100,000 South Korean civilians abducted by the North during the Korean War. 

“Not a day goes by that I am not thankful that I was able to return home after my service in Korea,” Rep. Charles Rangel, who introduced the resolution, said. "Sadly, thousands of American soldiers and South Koreans have not made it back for 60 years.  I hope this resolution could bring some closure to their families and friends.”

In October, North Korea and the United States agreed to resume operations to recover the remains of US servicemen unaccounted for during the Korean War. The remains recovery program, initiated in 1996, was suspended in 2005 amid growing tensions with North Korea.

For more information, see 's briefing book on Korean War POW/MIAs.

North Korea's New Course

December 8, 2011

Members Robert Carlin and John Lewis write in the Los Angeles Times that the focus of North Korea's policies has shifted decisively toward China, and that Pyongyang's 1991-2009 strategy to seek rapprochement with the United States has run its course.

Any shards remaining from the North's previous, decades-long effort to normalize ties with the U.S. were swept away by current leader Kim Jong Il's trip in May to China, his third in barely a year. Based on our discussions with Chinese officials, we believe that during that visit, Pyongyang and Beijing came to an understanding that, in preparation for planned, major domestic political events in 2012, both sides require sustained political stability, a convergence of interests that provides the opportunity for expanding bilateral relations beyond anything enjoyed in the past. The North is building toward a "prosperous and powerful" nation in celebration of the Kim Il Sung centenary in April; the Chinese are looking toward their 18th Party Congress scheduled for late next year. In both cases, it was apparently decided, stability on the Korean peninsula would serve economic programs and the succession of a new generation of leaders.

In the arrangements — formal and informal — that emerged from Kim Jong Il's discussions with his hosts, Pyongyang agreed not to "make trouble" (as the Chinese described it to us) in the short term, presumably meaning no deliberate military provocations, no third nuclear test and no launch of another ballistic missile. Beyond that, the talks ended in a compromise that neither side found entirely satisfactory. Kim came away with less aid and a smaller Chinese commitment of support than he had sought, though Pyongyang typically asks for more than it can get.

The North did, however, receive increased access to both Chinese capital and technology in spite of United Nations and other foreign sanctions. Kim also obtained, through the establishment of joint economic zones with China along the Yalu River, a locale to test adjustments necessary to economic development, adjustments that would fall short of what Beijing considers genuine economic reform. Chinese President Hu Jintao, we were told, had to settle for Kim's promise to cause less trouble but without a North Korean commitment to serious steps toward denuclearization.

Read more...

North Korea and the Food-Aid Dilemma

December 13, 2011

Mort Abramowitz argues in The National Interest that the US claim of reluctance to deliver aid to North Korea because of fears of diversion and inadequate monitoring runs contrary to the claims of South Korean observers and US-based NGOs. "Without context," he writes, "one might be led to believe that North Korea is refusing any monitoring of the food-aid distribution and disallowing any contact between its citizens and international organizations."

Quite to the contrary, this is not the case even in recent South Korean experience. In August, representatives from the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a South Korea-based NGO, visited North Korea to observe and monitor the distribution of aid to the people of Sariwon; a senior South Korean official monitored private wheat deliveries earlier this month. In October, after visiting the provinces most affected by this year’s flooding, representatives from U.S.-based NGOs Mercy Corps and Samaritan’s Purse noted that they were very satisfied with the monitoring and oversight of the food aid. They not only delivered food aid to the intended needy but also expressed confidence they can continue to do so. Other countries have ponied up funds for food, which reportedly is being properly delivered via safeguards that were agreed upon between Pyongyang, the World Food Program and the European Union.

For all the fastidiousness displayed by the U.S. government, there is no indication that it has recently discussed in detail with North Korea provisions for adequately monitoring food aid. The last agreement reached was in 2008 under a Republican administration.

Meanwhile, NGOs, international agencies and numerous independent scholars have continued to warn against letting conditions further deteriorate in North Korea. UN undersecretary general Valerie Amos returned from North Korea in October reporting “terrible levels of malnutrition” wreaking havoc, in particular among the very young. By studying the flux of prices in the North Korean market, Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has pointed out how the price of grain is continuing to rise even after the harvest, unlike in other years, painting a foreboding picture of the winter to come. Alongside accounts by NGOs of hunger-induced illnesses and lack of medical supplies, the signs of a worsening humanitarian situation could not be clearer. The consequences are alarming. In the short term: many children will die or be permanently blighted.

Read more...

For more on food aid, see 's humanitarian news digest.

Leon Sigal on Stopping a Nuclear North Korea

December 2, 2011

Writing in The National Interest, Member Leon Sigal argues that the Obama administration needs to begin negotiating with North Korea to suspend its uranium enrichment program, pointing out that the possible threat of secret enrichment facilities shouldn't stop action on the existing threat of the known enrichment facility at Yongbyon:

This week North Korea confirmed what satellite imagery has already detected, that its construction of a new nuclear power plant is “progressing apace.” So is its enrichment of uranium to fuel that plant. That spells double trouble for U.S. security. When completed, that power plant, like all nuclear reactors, will generate plutonium as a by-product of energy-generating fission. And given enough time and centrifuges, low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel can be turned into highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Washington can’t stop these dangerous developments without negotiating with Pyongyang. A third round of bilateral talks is likely this month, but talks are not negotiations. Wary of partisan criticism, President Obama has been loath to deal. Instead, he is insisting that North Korea stop enrichment, along with nuclear and missile testing, as a precondition for resuming six-party talks.

That won’t play in Pyongyang. It is willing to suspend nuclear and missile tests while negotiations proceed, but it won’t suspend enrichment at Yongbyon monitored by international inspectors without getting energy or other aid in return. As its Foreign Ministry spokesman put it, “The DPRK is ready to resume the six-party talks without preconditions and implement the joint statement in a phased manner on the principle of simultaneous actions.”

Read more...

 

Congressional Appropriations Bill on Food Aid Monitoring

November 16, 2011

A Minibus appropriations bill containing funding for the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, and Transportation, among other agencies, has recently passed through Congress and is awaiting the president's signature. The bill requires that funds dispersed through the Food for Peace Act "may only be used to provide assistance to recipient nations if adequate monitoring and controls, as determined by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, are in place to ensure that emergency food aid is received by the intended beneficiaries in areas affected by food shortages and not diverted for unauthorized or inappropriate purposes." 

This language was included in the bill to ensure that any future aid program to North Korea contain adequate monitoring provisions. The Congressional Record states that "the conferees

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