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Modérateurs
·Anouk Barberousse
·Nicolas Bullot
·Gloria Origgi
·John Zeimbekis
Invités
·Catherine Allamel-Raffin
·Sylvie Allouche
·Daniel Andler
·Noga Arikha
·John Armstrong
·Sarah Bendaoud
·Keith Benson
·Paul Bloom
·Roberto Casati
·David Cohen
·Jean-Pierre Cometti
·Thi Bich Doan
·Jérôme Dokic
·Shimon Edelman
·Paul Egré
·Nivedita Gangopadhyay
·Merideth Gattis
·Tamar Gendler
·Donald Glowinski
·Bastien Guerry
·José Luis Guijarro
·Jim Hamilton
·Claude Imbert
·Pierre Jacob
·Andrew Kania
·Paolo Leonardi
·Jerrold Levinson
·Mohan Matthen
·Richard Minsky
·Simona Morini
·Jacques Morizot
·Alexander Nagel
·Alva Noë
·Jérôme Pelletier
·Catherine Recanati
·Sébastien Réhault
·Patrick Rysiew
·Harold A. Sedgwick
·Nola Semczyszyn
·Dan Sperber
·Keith Stenning
·Mauricio Suárez
·Anne Tüscher
·Barbara Tversky
·Jeffrey M. Zacks
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Le Département d’Etudes Cognitives de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure organise sur cette page une série de rencontres thématiques pour débattre des rapports entre l'art et la cognition. Chaque mois, de nouveaux papiers seront ouverts à la discussion par un panel de discutants invités à s'exprimer sur un thème en particulier. Le premier thème en discussion est:
Les Images dans la Cognition et la Science
Les images sont des représentations externes non linguistiques; en tant que telles, elles peuvent exploiter la finesse de grain qui vient normalement avec l'accointance perceptive, par opposition à la description verbale. Mais comment ce trait distinctif des images se traduit-il en une forme de signification? Quel est le rôle des concepts et de la perception de la profondeur dans la compréhension des images? Quel est le statut sémantique de la perception des images lors de l'expérience multimodale de films ou de simulations virtuelles? (Thème I) Par ailleurs, comment utilisons-nous les images? La conférence portera sur les différents usages scientifiques des images, qu'elles soient des dessins, des diagrammes ou des photographies. Les images sont des véhicules authentiques des contenus scientifiques, mais les raisons pour lesquelles elles jouent un rôle aussi indispensable sont bien mal comprises. Parfois, les images sont des données. Cela signifie-t-il que l'observation des images a la même valeur épistémique que l'observation de scènes naturelles? Les images peuvent-elles être davantage que des facilitateurs cognitifs dans des contextes scientifiques? Peuvent-elles être des parties d'arguments, ou les arguments sont-il strictement linguistiques? Comment peuvent-elles représenter des (parties de) modèles théoriques? (Thème II)
Une bibliographie et un ensemble de liens utiles sont également à disposition sur le site en cliquant en haut sur bibliographie et liens
Un premier colloque sur Art et cognition est archivé sur ce site. En partenariat avec
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Art and Neuroscience
John Hyman
Some prominent neuroscientists have recently made ambitious claims about their work on the visual arts, which they regard as initiating a new scientific enterprise, called ‘neuro-aesthetics’. In particular, V.S. Ramachandran says that he has discovered ‘the key to understanding what art really is’; and Semir Zeki claims to have laid the foundations for understanding ‘the biological basis of aesthetic experience’. In this article I discuss the prospects for this new scientific field, focusing on these two authors.
Date de publication : 9 janvier 2006
On the nature and perception of depictions
Thomas Stoffregen
Following a venerable debate, I discuss the nature of depictions. My discussion focuses on dynamic depictions (film), but the arguments are intended to be general. I also discuss the perception of depictions. Here I argue that the perception of depictions is veridical. That is, I claim that people correctly perceive the depiction, as such, and rarely (if ever) believe that they are experiencing "the real thing" (that is, that which is depicted). Finally, I point out that while many depictions are uni-modal (e.g., paintings, silent movies), the act of perceiving depictions always involves stimulation of multiple perceptual systems. The perception of depictions is always multimodal.
Date de publication : 28 novembre 2005
Cross-Modal Effects in Motion Picture Perception: Toward an Interactive Theory of Film
Mark Rollins
Pictures can be distinguished from other symbol types by virtue of the fact that their interpretation is grounded on perception in certain ways. I argue that the relevant perceptual abilities involve heuristic processes that require internal representations. However, those are limited in detail and in the scope of knowledge on which they draw. To a large extent, this is due to the interactive nature of the internal mechanisms that implement them. Cross-modal effects exemplify the relevant type of interactions. I suggest that an analysis of such effects shows that movies as multimedia representations do not constitute a distinct representational genre, characterized by a special mode of interpretation that sets them apart from static pictures.
Date de publication : 7 novembre 2005
Film as Dynamic Event Perception
Heiko Hecht
This paper assesses the differences between natural viewing and motion pictures viewing. This is done from a psychological perspective labeled dynamic event perception. A set of perceptual regularities constitute natural events. Film has the opportunity (and artistic necessity) to violate some of these regularities. But why do directors choose to violate some laws of natural viewing while they stay away from violating others? I argue that directors have violated almost every single spatio-temporal law that holds for natural events. The causality of natural events, on the other hand, is rarely touched in film. Directors fall into a realism trap that prevents them from commit ting causality violations.
Date de publication : 19 septembre 2005
Any Way You Slice It: The Viewpoint Independence of Pictorial Content
John Kulvicki
We understand pictures irrespective of the point from which we view them, even though pictures depict things from a point of view. Philosophers and psychologists tend to claim that we somehow compensate for odd viewing angles when viewing a picture. I show that once we understand the complexities of pictorial content, compensation becomes unnecessary.
Date de publication : 27 juin 2005
Scientific Reasoning, Mental Models, and Depiction
Laura Perini
Figures seem to play an important role in scientific reasoning, but the nature of reasoning with images is not yet understood. In this paper I will draw on the literature on mental models to provide some insight into the reasoning that scientists apply when working with visual representations.
Date de publication : 20 juin 2005
Dual Recognition of Depth and Dependent Seeing
John Dilworth
An explanation of the seeing of depth both in reality and in pictures requires a dual content theory of visual recognition. In addition, there are two necessary conditions on genuine seeing of depth-related content. First, the right kinds of dependence relations must hold between a physical picture, its content and its perceiver, and second, the perceiver must be in an appropriate, functionally defined perceptual state.
Date de publication : 6 juin 2005
Le Dessin dans les Sciences Sociales : L'Illustration Lithique
Dominic Lopes
Les images sont utilisées en sciences pour présenter des données. En prenant les sciences physiques et biologiques comme des paradigmes, on pourrait supposer que les images faites à la machine servent cet objectif mieux que les images faites à la main. Une approche de l'usage des images scientifiques, dont l'extension est plus large, au point d'inclure les sciences sociales, montre que cette supposition est fausse. Les dessins archéologiques d'artefacts humains, comme les outils de pierre taillée, sont préférés aux photographies. L'explication de ce fait est que le système humain de production de dessins est un outil observationnel doté de pouvoirs spéciaux.
Date de publication : 23 mai 2005
Sulla finzione necessaria
Maria Bettetini
Une éthique du regard, de la lecture et de l'écoute nous apprendrait à distinguer entre la fiction nécessaire de chaque oeuvre d'art et le degré supplémentaire de fiction qu'elle acquiert dans la communication. Une approche neo-platonique pour une éthique du regard.
Date de publication : 28 avril 2005
From Original to Copy and Back Again
James Elkins
Historians have been largely silent during the debates on Goodman's claim that one cannot distinguish an authentic from a forged painting by "merely looking". This paper opens the limited dialogue between art history and aesthetics by exploring the ways that forgeries, copies, and originals function within historical and critical discourse. Instead of comparing authentic and inauthentic, I will be comparing imperceptible difference with immediately obvious difference.
Date de publication : 22 novembre 2004
Replicative forgery
John Zeimbekis
I argue that there is no distinction between allographic and autographic representations. One consequence of this is that replicative forgeries have the same aesthetic and artistic value as originals, and are accurate records of actions. I end with some reflections on the pragmatic structure of forgery.
Date de publication : 2 novembre 2004
Forgery and Reproduction
Gregory Currie
Forgery needs to be distinguished from reproduction. It is sometimes said that the aesthetically relevant question raised by the existence of artistic forgery is whether a picture visually indistinguishable from a valuable picture is itself valuable--to the same or to any degree. Yet I suggest that one may have no qualms, aesthetic or of any other kinds, about the honest reproduction of art while at the same time thinking that forgery is a bad thing.
Date de publication : 18 octobre 2004
L'ontologie du faux
Roger Pouivet
Le faux n'a pas de nature propre puisqu'il dépend d'une attribution erronée
intentionnellement trompeuse. En revanche, le faux a un mode d'existence,
parasitaire de la chose authentique. Pour préciser ce mode d'existence, la
bonne question n'est pas "Qu'est-ce qu'un faux ?", mais "De quoi peut-il y
avoir un faux ?" La distinction proposée par Nelson Goodman entre artefacts
autographiques et artefacts allographiques, systématiquement critiquée
depuis quelques années, fournit-elle la réponse à cette question ?
Date de publication : 4 octobre 2004
Authenticity in Art
Denis Dutton
Works of art possess what we may call nominal authenticity, defined simply as the correct identification of the origins, authorship, or provenance of an object, ensuring that an object of aesthetic experience is properly named. However, the concept of authenticity often connotes something else, having to do with an object’s character as a true expression of an individual’s or a society’s values and beliefs. This second sense of authenticity can be called expressive authenticity. The following discussion will summarize some of the problems surrounding nominal authenticity and will conclude with a general examination of expressive authenticity. This paper is excerpted from a longer version published in the Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics.
Date de publication : 15 septembre 2004
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